Values and cognitive reflection: verifying the social heuristics hypothesis
Psychology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2025-2-216-228Keywords:
cognitive reflection, social heuristics, values, coping behaviorAbstract
The paper examines the correlations between values (prosocial and egoistic ones) and inclinations to reflexive/intuitive processing of information in young people. The key purpose of the research is to verify the social heuristics hypothesis which declares that reflection promotes egoism, while intuition is associated with prosocial behavior and cooperation. The first hypothesis is that scarce cognitive reflection results in a wide choice of values associated with the concern for people and preservation and a narrow choice of values associated with self-affirmation and being open to changes. The second hypothesis states that deficits in cognitive reflection are connected with prosocial coping strategies. According to the third hypothesis, positive prosocial experience manifested in the preference for prosocial coping strategies is a factor in strengthening the positive relationship between prosocial values and intuitive problem solving. Methodologically, the study relies on dual process theory and the Schwartz theory of basic values. The study sampled 85 female students of Perm State Humanitarian-Pedagogical University aged from 17 to 25 (M = 19.1; SD = 0.96). The respondents’ test books included three psychodiagnostic tests: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-7 by М. Toplak, R. West, К. Stanovich, adapted by A.A. Vikhman), Portrait Values Questionnaire – Revised (PVQ-R adapted by Sh. Schwartz, Т.P. Butenko, D.S. Sedova, А.S. Lipatova), and Ways of Coping Questionnaire (WCQ) from R. Lazarus and S. Folkman, adapted into Russian by E.V. Bityutskaya. Correlation analysis revealed a set of reliable links in cognitive reflection (CRT-r), intuitive mistakes (CRT-i), and prosocial values. This generally supports the social heuristics hypothesis. The manifested values of conformism (r = 0.284; p < 0.01), traditions (r = 0.273; p < 0.01), and kindness (r = 0.245; p < 0.05) are associated with the inclination to generate an intuitive and wrong answer that first comes to mind. Prosocial coping showed the only statistically reliable positive correlational link between scarce cognitive reflection (a share of intuitive mistakes in CRT) and the types of coping behavior (r = 0.199; p < 0.05). Along with that, respondents with manifested coping behavior, these tending to ask others for help, develop multiple correlations between prosocial values and intuitive mistakes. On the other hand, females with lower prosocial coping showed no reliable correlation between the values and reflective/intuitive solutions for problems with intuitive traps. The study illustrates that the hypotheses are empirically supported, which, in turn, proves the validity of the social heuristics hypothesis. It is important that developed prosocial coping enhances the correlation between prosocial values and intuitive behavior patterns in solving cognitive problems.References
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