Analyzing the problem of artificial intelligence through the prism of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy
Philosophy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2024-4-463-470Keywords:
thinking, categories, imagination, mind, reason, weak and strong intelligence, capacity to judge, reflection, supercomputerAbstract
The research examines the structure of the mind in I. Kant’s philosophy as an archetype of artificial intelligence. Categories of the mind are considered as logical drivers of the productive imagination synthesis. Since the temporal schemes of imagination synthesis basically contain a transcendental account, the mind acts as a calculation. This formal counting mechanism can be separated from the work of the living mind and reproduced technically in artificial intelligence systems. The unconditionality of the ideas of the mind means the arbitrariness of setting them as functions of the mind program. However, in relation to the final computer (the mind), they act only as logical regulators of its operation. In this case, the theoretical mind is a weak intellect. Another logical driver of categorical synthesis is the idea of practical reason. From the point of view of the functioning of the mind program, the logical driver switches from the regulatory function to the constitutive one. This means that the practical reason implements a version of strong intelligence. With this understanding of the mind, the capacity to judge in the process of categorical synthesis performs a synthetic role relative to the categories of the mind. In this case, the category table gives possible images of hypothetical objects. The problem of artificial intelligence lies precisely in the reproduction of the free play of the capacity to judge. But then the question arises about superintelligence understood as a supercomputer with high computing power or a biocomputer whose principles include the functions of free choice or learning, so it can be a programmer of itself. From the point of view of Kant’s doctrine of reason, any intellect can only be finite: it can program itself as a computer, but it cannot set its being.References
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