F. Brentano's theory of the primary act of consciousness

Philosophy

Authors

  • Yegor A. Toroshchin Perm State University, 15, Bukirev st., Perm, 614068, Russia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2026-2-235-243

Keywords:

Brentano, Husserl, Aristotle, intentionality, presentation, psychical act, meaning, sense, phenomenology

Abstract

The article analyzes the key stages in the formation of the phenomenological theory of meaning, which has its roots in the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It examines Brentano’s critique of Aristotle’s formal-logical paradigm and his concept of intentionality as an essential characteristic of psychical phenomena. Special attention is paid to Brentano’s distinction between the act of presentation and the object of presentation, which lays the groundwork for the subsequent analysis of consciousness. The study substantiates a series of interconnected theses. Firstly, unlike Aristotle, Brentano identifies the pre-logical layer of consciousness — the psychical act of presentation that precedes any judgment and is responsible for the very constitution of objectivity. This act does not exist in the formal-logical sense since, by the time a judgment occurs, it has already taken place, leaving us only with its result; thus, intentionality resides in a kind of transcendental field in relation to formal logic. Secondly, the product of the intentional act is a unified presentation of the object — an objective unity constituted in psychical activity. This unity, being an inseparable correlate of the act of consciousness and its directedness toward an object, can justifiably be termed the immanent object. Thirdly, this immanent object, possessing a unity of meaning and serving as the subjective correlate of the real object, can be defined as the meaning of the object. While serving as the subject of predication in a judgment, it is itself formed in the process of meaning-constitution, which occurs prior to any logical predication. Taken together, these propositions lead to the conclusion that Brentano’s introduction of intentionality and his analysis of the structure of presentation lay the conceptual foundations for Edmund Husserl’s subsequent transition from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology, which investigates the pure structures of consciousness and meaning-constitution.

Author Biography

  • Yegor A. Toroshchin, Perm State University, 15, Bukirev st., Perm, 614068, Russia
    Assistant Lecturer of the Department of Philosophy

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Published

2026-07-03

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Section

Philosophy