LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS UNDER THE DOMINANCE OF ONE PARTY: STRATEGIES OF INTERACTION BETWEEN UNITED RUSSIA AND THE PARLIAMEN-TARY OPPOSITION IN THE SPHERE OF ECOLOGY (IV-VII CONVOCATIONS)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2025-4-92-101Keywords:
environmental policy, State Duma of the Russian Federation, United Russia, systemic opposition, legislative coalitions, issue-focused legislation, symbolic legislationAbstract
This article examines the formation of legislative coalitions under the dominance of a single party, using the example of interactions between United Russia and the systemic opposition (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and A Just Russia) in the area of environmental policy in the State Duma of the 4th–7th convocations. It addresses the central question of the motivation of the ruling party, which holds a constitutional majority, to enter into coalitions with the opposition, for which such alliances are a necessary strategy for overcoming the institutional barrier to the adoption of legislation. Using a theoretical framework combining coalition theory and the concept of symbolic legislation, two competing hypotheses are put forward and empirically tested. According to the first, coalitions are problem-oriented in nature and serve as a tool for legitimizing politically risky decisions. The second hypothesis suggests that coalitions are used for symbolic control over public discourse and responding to public demand. The empirical basis of the study is 40 inter-faction environmental bills selected from the System for Supporting Legislative Activity (SSLA). Their classification using the DeepSeek-R1 neural network model and subsequent manual verification revealed an overwhelming predominance of issue-focused initiatives (93%), refuting the hypothesis that cooperation is primarily symbolic. The main conclusion of the article is that United Russia uses coalitions with the opposition not to overcome a numerical deficit, but to optimize political transaction costs and legitimize potentially unpopular bills. TReferences
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