«Consciousness steps» of mental experience in phenomenological paradigm
Philosophy
Keywords:
unconscious feelings, the potential intentionality, explicit knowledgeAbstract
A phenomenological critique of the concept of "unconscious feelings" is presented There is considered an alternative view in which the so-called "unconsciousness" is presented as a potential intentionality, as transcendence. There is presented the process of explicit knowledge as a gradual clarification of experience.References
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(2). Руткевич А.М. Психоанализ. Истоки и первые этапы развития. М., 1997.
(3). Фрейд З. «Я» и «Оно». Труды разных лет. Книга I. Тбилиси, 1991.
(4). Фромм Э. Психоанализ и этика. М., 1993.
(5). Bugental J.F.T. The third force in psychology // J. of Humanistic Psychology. 1964. V. 4, № 1. P. 19–26.
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2011-09-30
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