MASS MOBILIZATION AND AUTOCRATIC CONCESSIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Keywords:
mass mobilization, collective actions, authoritarian regimes, institutional theory, public campaigns, dictatorships, political institutionsAbstract
Why are some authoritarian regimes more inclined to make concessions to mass movements than others? In this article, based on the institutional theory of autocracies, I posit that institutionalized regimes should be more prone to concessions than regimes without parties and elected parliaments. This expectation is due to the capacity of the institutions to provide an opportunity for negotiation and representation of interests of mass movements, thus I expect the dictators in such regimes to bow more frequently to the demands of mass movements. Using the NAVCO database, the Barbara Geddes typology, and indicators of the institutionalization of autocracies, I test hypotheses about the relationship between institutions and concessions on a global sample of authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010. The results of statistical modeling do not confirm the hypotheses and, if anything, demonstrate that there are no serious differences between the types of authoritarian regimes regarding compliance with the demands of mass movements; moreover, the institutionalized autocracies are somewhat less inclined to satisfy the demand than dictatorships without elected parliaments and independent opposition parties. This empirical pattern points to a number of interesting questions for subsequent research on the links between institutions and the dynamics of mobilization in authoritarian regimes.DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2020-4-98-106References
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