ELECTORAL LOYALTY AND QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN RUSSIAN MUNICIPALITIES

Authors

  • Маргарита Завадская / Margarita Zavadskaya European University at St. Petersburg and the Alexander Institute of the University of Helsinki http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3728-4073

Keywords:

quality of public goods provision, governance, local self-government, municipal heads, electoral mobilization

Abstract

Local self-government in Russia has undergone a number of transformations - from spontaneous decentralization in the 1990s until the stage-by-stage integration into the state vertical system from 2003-2006. Despite the de facto loss of political and, partly, administrative autonomy, we see a huge diversity in the quality of governance and provision of public goods at the local level.Based on the Database of Municipalities' Characteristics (DMC) of Rosstat from 2008 to 2017 and data from the Central Election Commission (CEC of the Russian Federation), the article presents indices of the quality of the provision of public goods and analyzes the relationship with the Duma voting in 2016 and the budgetary autonomy of the municipality. Despite the continuing centralization of government, researchers still observe an impressive variation in both the formats of political competition and administrative practices in the regions, especially at the local level.The results of the analysis point to a number of patterns: 1. There is no strong link between budget independence and the quality of management; 2. Securing votes does not lead to the attraction of additional resources to the field and may even divert scarce funds and the human resources to technically support this loyalty.DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2020-4-62-75

Author Biography

Маргарита Завадская / Margarita Zavadskaya, European University at St. Petersburg and the Alexander Institute of the University of Helsinki

PhD in Political Science, Research Fellow, Faculty of Political Science

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Published

2020-12-27

How to Cite

Margarita Zavadskaya М. З. /. (2020). ELECTORAL LOYALTY AND QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN RUSSIAN MUNICIPALITIES. Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, 14(4), 62–75. Retrieved from http://press.psu.ru/index.php/polit/article/view/4006