POSITION IN EXCHANGE FOR VOTES: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LOYALTY ON THE POLITICAL SURVIVAL OF MUNICIPAL HEADS WITHIN COMPETITIVE MODEL

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2023-4-9-21

Keywords:

heads of local self-government; political survival; electoral loyalty; economic efficiency; competitive mod-el; region government; principal-agent relationship

Abstract

The article explores the research problem associated with the political survival of local heads amidst the conditions of competitive mayoral elections. It probes questions like: Does political loyalty remain a significant factor for retaining a position? How does a mayor's political loyalty influence their political survival within a competitive framework? Employing the principal-agent theory, we examine factors such as electoral loyalty, economic efficiency, and personal characteristics of mayors (such as origin, age, work experience in local self-government executive branch, and electoral experience) as determinants of mayoral political survival. Our study encompasses 208 contests held in the Perm region and Sverdlovsk region from 2015 to 2022. Our regression analysis shows that successful electoral mobilization and high voting results for the "United Russia" party or the incumbent enhance a mayor's chances of retaining their position. However, a mayor's socio-economic success does not significantly impact their political "survival". Moreover, electoral loyalty is not the sole significant determinant of a mayor's "survival". Factors such as the local head's age and origin also play a role in their retention of position. This article broadens the understanding of the political survival of Russian local mayors and underscores the need to explore other explanatory models of mayoral "survival".

Author Biography

А. А. Subbotina, Perm State University

IV year student, Faculty of History and Political Science

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Published

2023-12-22

How to Cite

Subbotina А. А. (2023). POSITION IN EXCHANGE FOR VOTES: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LOYALTY ON THE POLITICAL SURVIVAL OF MUNICIPAL HEADS WITHIN COMPETITIVE MODEL. Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, 17(4). https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2023-4-9-21