STATIONARY BANDITS AND MOONLIGHTING POLITICIANS: THE REVIEW OF THE RESERCH ON BUSINESS AND POLITICS IN RUSSIAN REGIONS
Keywords:
Russian regions, regional politics, regional business, business and politics, corporate political strategy, politically connected firmsAbstract
Business plays a big role in politics all over the world due to its special interests, possession over autonomous resources, and importance for economic development and social stability. Russia and its regions are not an exception, business actors and the state are connected in a complex system of interactions and neopatrimonial exchange. In many regions, local business is a powerful political actor which is able to lobby its interests and influence regional electoral outcomes. The article reviews the research on business and politics in Russian regions. The research on Russia contributed considerably to our understanding of business actors’ direct political participation. It was made possible by the unique constellation of political and institutional factors. Moreover, the existing body of research demonstrates a complex picture of state-business interdependence that transcends the simplified models of state-business relations in authoritarian regimes.DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2021-1-119-129References
Барсукова, С. Ю., Денисова-Шмидт, Е. В. (2020) ‘«Политические инвестиции» бизнеса в России, или почему бизнес финансирует избирательные компании?’, Полис. Политические исследования, 3, сc. 110‒125. [Barsuko-va, S. Yu., Denisova-Schmidt, Ye. V. (2020) ‘Political “Investments” by Businesses in Russia, or Why Does Business Finance Election Campaigns?’ [«Politicheskiye investitsii» biznesa v Rossii, ili pochemu biznes finansiruyet izbiratel'nyye kompanii?], Polis. Political studies 3, рp. 110‒125, https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2020.03.08. (In Russ.)].
Барсукова, С. Ю., Звягинцев, В. И. (2006) ‘Механизм «политического инвестирования», или как и зачем бизнес участвует в выборах и оплачивает партийную жизнь’, Экономическая социология, 7(2), сc. 8‒22. [Barsukova, S. Yu., Zvyagintsev, V. I. (2006) ‘Political investment mechanism or Why and how business participates in elections and finance political parties’ [Mekhanizm «politicheskogo investirovaniya», ili kak i zachem biznes uchastvuyet v vyborakh i oplachivayet partiynuyu zhizn'], Ekonomicheskaya sotsiologiya, 7(2), рp. 8‒22. (In Russ.)].
Бычкова, О., Гельман, В. (2010) ‘Экономические акторы и локальные режимы в крупных городах России’, Неприкосновенный запас, 2. [Bychkova, O., Gel'man V. (2010) ‘Economic actors and local regimes in big Russian cities’ [Ekonomicheskiye aktory i lokal'nyye rezhimy v krupnykh gorodakh Rossii], Neprikosnovenny Zapas, 2. (In Russ.)].
Гаман-Голутвина, О. В. (2004a) ‘Региональные элиты России: персональный состав и тенденции эволюции (I) ’, Полис. Политические исследования, 2, сc. 6–19, DOI:10.17976/jpps/2004.02.02. [Gaman-Golutvina, O. V. (2004a) ‘Russian regional elites: personalities and evolutionary tendencies (I)’ [Regional'nyye elity Rossii: personal'nyy sostav i tendentsii evolyutsii (I)], Polis. Political Studies, 2, рp. 6–19, DOI:10.17976/jpps/2004.02.02. (In Russ.)].
Гаман-Голутвина, О. В. (2004b) ‘Региональные элиты России: персональный состав и тенденции эволюции (II)’, Полис. Политические исследования, 3, сc. 22–32, DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2004.03.03. [Gaman-Golutvina, O. V. (2004b) ‘Russian regional elites: personalities and evolutionary tendencies (II)’ [Regional'nyye elity Rossii: personal'nyy sostav i tendentsii evolyutsii (II)], Polis. Political Studies, 3, cс. 22–32, DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2004.03.03. (In Russ.)].
Зубаревич, Н. В. (2013) ‘Взаимоотношения бизнеса и власти в регионах России’, Россия 2013. Ежегодный доклад Франко-российского аналитического центра Обсерво. [Zubarevich, N. V. (2013) ‘State-business interaction in Russian regions’ [Vzaimootnosheniya biznesa i vlasti v regionakh Rossii], Ros-siya 2013. Ezhegodnyi doklad Franko-rossiiskogo analiticheskogo tsentra Obser-vo. (In Russ.)].
Сироткина Е. В., Карандашова С. А. (2017) ‘Лояльность элит и выборы глав регионов: роль предвыборных конфликтов в исходе голосования’, Полис. Политические исследования, 6, cс. 76–91, DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2017.06.06. [Sirotkina E. V., Karandashova S. A. (2017) ‘Elite loyalty and gubernatorial elections: the role of conflicts in electoral outcomes’ [Loyal'nost' elit i vybory glav regionov: rol' predvybornykh konfliktov v iskhode golosovaniya], Polis. Political Studies, 6, рp. 76–91. (In Russ.)].
Сюняев, Г., Полищук, Л. (2014) ‘Инвестиционный климат и сменяемость власти в российских регионах’, Вопросы экономики, 2, cс. 88–117. [Syunyaev, G., Polishchuk, L. (2014) ‘Investment climate and alternation of power in Russian regions’ [Investitsionnyy klimat i smenyayemost' vlasti v rossiyskikh regionakh], Voprosy ekonomiki, 2, pр. 88–117. (In Russ.)].
Тев, Д. Б. (2006) ‘Политэкономический подход в анализе местной власти. К вопросу о коалиции, правящей в Санкт-Петербурге’, Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭКС, 2 (2), сс. 99‒118. [Tev, D. B. (2006) ‘Politico-economic approach to the analysis of local authorities. To the issue of the coalition that governs St. Petersburg’ [Politekonomicheskiy podkhod v analize mestnoy vlasti. K voprosu o koalitsii, pravyashchey v Sankt-Peterburge], Political expertise: POLITEX, 2(2), pр. 99‒118. (In Russ.)].
Тев, Д. Б. (2008) ‘Владельцы и девелоперы недвижимости Калининграда: связи с властью и политические выгоды’, Политическая наука, 3, cс. 175–193. [Tev, D. B. (2008) ‘Owners and developers in Kaliningrad: connections to authorities and political benefits’ [Vladel'tsy i developery nedvizhimosti Kaliningrada: svyazi s vlast'yu i politicheskiye vygody], Political Science, 3, рp. 175–193. (In Russ.)].
Чирикова, А. Е. (2012). ‘Государство и бизнес: взаимодействие на поле социальной политики в современной России’ в: Горшков М. К. Россия Реформирующаяся, Вып. 11, Москва: Новый Хронограф, сс. 169–190. [Chirikova, A. E. (2012). ‘State and business: interaction in the field of social policy’ [Gosudarstvo i biznes: vzaimodeystviye na pole sotsial'noy politiki v sovremennoy Rossii] in: Gorshkov M. K. Rossiya Reformiruyushchayasya, Vyp. 11, Moskva: Novyi Khronograf, pр. 169–190. (In Russ.)].
Яковлев А. А., Ершова Н. В., Уварова О. М. (2020). ‘Каким фирмам государство оказывает поддержку: анализ изменения приоритетов в кризисных условиях’, Вопросы экономики, 3, сс. 47‒62, https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-47-62. [Yakovlev, A. A., Yershova N. V., Uvarova O. M. (2020) ‘What kind of Russian firms get state support: the analysis of changes in priori-ties under crisis conditions’ [Kakim fir-mam gosudarstvo okazyvayet pod-derzhku: analiz izmeneniya prioritetov v krizisnykh usloviyakh], Voprossy Ekonomiki, 3, pр. 47‒62, https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-47-62. (In Russ.)].
Amore, M. D., Bennedsen, M. (2013) ‘The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment’, Journal of Fi-nancial Economics, 110(2), pр. 110, 387–402, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.06.002.
Arriola, L. R. (2013) ‘Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies’, World Politics, 65, рp. 233–272, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887113000051.
Calì, M., Sen, K. (2011) ‘Do Effective State Business Relations Matter for Economic Growth? Evidence from Indian States’, World Development, 39, рp. 1542–1557,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.004.
Chebankova, E. (2010) ‘Business and Politics in the Russian Regions’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 26, рp. 25–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523270903522845.
Dahl, R. (1971) Poliarchy. Yale University Press.
Faccio, M. (2010) ‘Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis’, Financial Management, 39, pр. 905–928, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01099.x.
Faccio, M. (2006) ‘Politically Connected Firms’, American Economic Review, 96, pр. 369–386,
https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157704.
Figueiredo, J. M. de, Tiller, E. H. (2001) ‘The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission’, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10, pр. 91–122, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00091.x.
Fisman, D., Fisman, R. J., Galef, J., Khurana, R., Wang, Y. (2012) ‘Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney’, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 13(3), https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1682.3272.
Frye, T. (2002) ‘Capture or Exchange? Business Lobbying in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 54, pр. 1017–1036.
Frye, T., Reuter, O. J., Szakonyi, D. (2019) ‘Hitting Them With Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia’, British Journal of Political Science, 49, pр. 857–881, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000752.
Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., Naticchioni, P. (2010) ‘Moonlighting politicians’, Journal of Public Economics, 94, рp. 688–699, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.001.
Gehlbach, S., Sonin, K., Zhuravskaya, E. (2010) ‘Businessman Candidates’, American Journal of Political Science, 54, pр. 718–736, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00456.x.
Gel’man, V., Avdonin, V., Ryzhenkov, S., Brie, M. (2005) Making and breaking democratic transitions: the comparative politics of Russia’s regions. Rowman & Littlefiel.
Geys, B., Mause, K. (2013) ‘Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 19, рp. 76–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2013.737158.
Gibson, E. L. (2005) ‘Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries’, World Politics, 58, рp. 101–132, https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0018.
Gilens, M., Page, B. I. (2014) ‘Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens’, Perspectives on Politics, 12, рp. 564–581, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595.
Govorun, A., Marques, I., Pyle, W. (2016) ‘The Political Roots of Intermediated Lobbying: evidence from Russian enterprises and business associations’, Business and Politics, 18 (4), pр. 395‒433, https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2015-0032.
Greene, K. F. (2010) ‘The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance’, Comparative Political Studies, 43, pр. 807–834, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009332462.
Hansen, W. L., Mitchell, N. J. (2000) ‘Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics’, American Political Science Review, 94, рp. 891–903, https://doi.org/10.2307/2586214.
Hellman, J. S. (1998) ‘Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions’, World Politics, 50, pр. 203–234, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008091.
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D. (2003) ‘Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, pр. 751–773, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.006.
Junisbai, B. (2012) ‘Improbable but Potentially Pivotal Oppositions: Privatization, Capitalists, and Political Contestation in the Post-Soviet Autocracies’, Perspectives on Politics, 10, pр. 891–916, https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271200285X.
Junisbai, B. (2010) ‘A Tale of Two Kazakhstans: Sources of Political Cleavage and Conflict in the Post-Soviet Period’, Europe-Asia Studies, 62, рp. 235–269, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130903506813.
Khwaja, A. I., Mian, A. (2005) ‘Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market’, Q J Econ, 120, pр. 1371–1411, https://doi.org/10.1162/003355305775097524.
Lawton, T., McGuire, S., Rajwani, T. (2013) ‘Corporate political activity: A literature review and research agenda’, International Journal of Management Reviews, 15, pр. 86–105.
Ledyaev, V., Chirikova, A. (2020) ‘Business in the Power Structure of Small Russian Towns’, Europe-Asia Studies, 72(4), рp. 686–711, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1626349.
Libman, A., Kozlov, V., Schultz, A. (2012) ‘Roving Bandits in Action: Outside Option and Governmental Predation in Autocracies’, Kyklos, 65, pр. 526–562, https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12005.
Lowi, T. J. (1964) ‘American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theo-ry’, World Politics, 16, pр. 677–715, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009452.
Lux, S., Crook, T. R., Woehr, D. J. (2011) ‘Mix-ing business with politics: A meta-analysis of the antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity’, Journal of management, 37, pр. 223–247.
Magaloni, B. (2008) ‘Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule’, Comparative Political Studies, 41 (4‒5), рp. 714‒741, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313124.
Markus, S. (2012) ‘Secure Property as a Bottom-Up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, and Predators in Weak States’, World Politics, 64, рp. 242–277, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887112000044.
Markus, S., Charnysh, V. (2017) ‘The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Developing Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 50, pр. 1632–1665, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016688000.
Marques II, I., Levina, I., Kazun, A., Yakovlev, A. (2020) ‘Calling the cavalry: firm-level investment in the fac of decentralized expropriation’, Journal of Institutional Economics, рp. 1‒16, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137420000028.
McMann, K. M. (2006) Economic autonomy and democracy: hybrid regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Cambridge University Press.
Moore, B. (1966) Social origins of democracy and dictatorship. Boston: Beacon.
Olson, M. (1993) ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87, pр. 567–576, https://doi.org/10.2307/2938736.
Ong, L. H. (2012) ‘Between Developmental and Clientelist States: Local State-Business Relationships in China’, Comparative Politics, 44, рp. 191–209.
Orttung, R. W. (2004) ‘Business and Politics in the Russian Regions’, Problems of Post-Communism, 51(2), рp. 48‒60.
Pepinsky, T. B. (2009) Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
Pyle, W. (2011) ‘Organized Business, Political Competition, and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Federation’, J Law Econ Organ, 27, pр. 2–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewp013.
Radnitz, S. (2010) ‘The color of money: Privatization, economic dispersion, and the post-Soviet “revolutions”’, Comparative Politics, 42, pр. 127–146.
Reuter, O. J., Szakonyi, D. (2019) ‘Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia’, American Political Science Review, 113, pр. 552–568.
Rochlitz, M. (2014) ‘Corporate raiding and the role of the state in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 30, pр. 89–114, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.856573.
Sakaeva, M. (2019) ‘Moonlighting Politicians in Russia: Defense Capacities of Business-people in Regional and Local Legislatures’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 27, pр. 75–99.
Sharafutdinova, G., Steinbuks, J. (2017) ‘Governors Matter: A Comparative Study of State-Business Relations in Russia’s Re-gions’, Econ Transit, 25(3), pр. 471‒493, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12124.
Snyder, R. (2001) ‘Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method’, St Comp Int Dev, 36, pр. 93–110, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687586.
Sonin, K. (2003) ‘Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, рp. 715–731, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.005.
Sun, X., Zhu, J., Wu, Y. (2014) ‘Organizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local Legisla-tures’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 14, рp. 1–30, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800009565.
Szakonyi, D. (2020) Politics for Profit: Business, Elections, and Policymaking in Russia. Cambridge University Press.
Szakonyi, D. (2018) ‘Businesspeople in Elected Office: Identifying Private Benefits from Firm-Level Returns’, American Political Science Review, 112, рp. 322–338,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000600.
Szakonyi, D. (2016) Renting Elected Office: Why Businesspeople Become Politicians in Russia. Columbia University.
Turovskii, R. (2008) ‘The representation of business elites in regional politics: étatism, elitism and clientelism’, in: Ross, C., Campbell, A. Federalism and Local Poli-tics in Russia. Routledge, pр. 200–222.
Volkov, V. (1999) ‘Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 51, pр. 741–754, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668139998697.
Walker, E. T., Rea, C. M. (2014) ‘The Political Mobilization of Firms and Industries’, Annu. Rev. Sociol., 40, рp. 281–304, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043215.
Yackee, J. W., Yackee, S. W. (2006) ‘A Bias To-wards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy’, The Journal of Politics, 68, рp. 128–139,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00375.x.
Yakovlev, A. (2006) ‘The Evolution of Business-State Interaction in Russia: From State Capture to Business Capture?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 58, pр. 1033–1056.
Yakovlev, A. (2011) ‘State-Business Relations in Russia in the 2000s: From the Capture Model to a Variety of Exchange Models?’, BOFIT Discussion papers, 10. Available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6386703.pdf (accessed: 31.05.2020).
Yakovlev, A., Sobolev, A., Kazun, A. (2014) ‘Means of production versus means of coercion: can Russian business limit the violence of a predatory state?’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 30, рp. 171–194, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.859434.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
The author grants the Publisher of the journal (Perm State University) the right to use their article in the journal, as well as to include the text of the abstract, the full text of the article and information about authors in the "Russian Science Citation Index" (RSCI).
The author agrees to the processing of personal data.
The right to use the journal as a whole belongs to the Publisher and acts indefinitely on the territory of the Russian Federation and beyond in accordance with cl. 1260 of the Russian Federation Civil Code.
There is no author's fee paid for providing the above rights by the author.
The author of the article included in the journal retains the exclusive right to it, regardless of the Publisher's right to use the journal as a whole:
a. The authors retain their copyrights to the article and transfer the right of the first publication along with the article to the journal, while also licensing it on the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which allows others to distribute this article with the obligatory indication of authorship of the article and reference to the original publication in this journal.
b. The authors retain the right to enter into separate, additional contractual agreements for the non-exclusive dissemination of the version of the text published by this journal (for example, post it in a university archive or publish it in a book), with reference to the original publication in this journal.
c. d. Authors are allowed to post their text on the Internet (for example, in a university archive or on their personal website) before and during the review process by this journal, as this can lead to a fruitful discussion and to higher number of the references to this published work (Please refer to The Effect of Open Access).
Submission of an article by the author implies that they agree for it to be used by the Publisher on the above conditions and to be included in the RSCI system. It also implicates that the author is aware of the terms of its use. The information about the author sent to the Publisher, including by e-mail, is also considered as such consent.
The editorial board posts the full text of the article on the Perm State University site: http://www.psu.ru and in the OJS system at http://press.psu.ru
The publication fee is not collected and fees are not paid. The author's copy is sent to the author to the address provided by them.
