MIXED INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARISM

Authors

Keywords:

political regime, electoral authoritarianism, mixed electoral system, electoral strategy, dominant party

Abstract

Over the past decade, the mixed system became the fastest growing variety of electoral systems used in elections for national legislatures. Opinions about the reasons for the popularity of mixed systems in the research literature still vary. There are no cross-national studies in political science that would link the use of a mixed independent electoral system with the consolidation of an authoritarian order. Under authoritarianism, elections perform three functions: imitation, control and signaling. These functions set the structure of incentives for choosing an electoral formula. The purpose of my study is to determine the structure of incentives for the employment of mixed independent electoral systems under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. One of the main results of the study is that, in comparison with democracies, mixed independent electoral systems are more often used in authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that mixed independent electoral system provides an opportunity to effectively realize the imitation, control and signaling functions of elections under electoral authoritarianism. DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2021-1-19-34

Author Biography

Виолетта Усова / V. А. Usova, European University at St. Petersburg

graduate student

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Published

2021-04-23

How to Cite

V. А. Usova В. У. /. (2021). MIXED INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARISM. Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, 15(1), 19–34. Retrieved from http://press.psu.ru/index.php/polit/article/view/4496