SURVIVAL ANALYSIS FOR AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN RE-SOURCE RENT ECONOMIES: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL
Keywords:
resource rent economy, resource dependence, natural resource rent, authoritarian regime, Cox regression, survival analysis, proportional hazards model, quality of governanceAbstract
Most researchers believe that states rich in natural resources are more able to maintain stability than those lacking resources. This research deals with exceptions that do not fit into this proposition. Based on the idea that the state’s ability to extract resources places it under certain obligations to secure the public contract, the author hypothesizes that the quality of governance mediates the influence of resource dependence on the stability of the autocracy. This factor is operationalized as the ability to pursue the declared policy and to distribute the public goods effectively. Using Cox regression, the author conducted a survival analysis, which made it possible to statistically substantiate this assumption, being theoretically justified and observed in some resource rent economies. The analysis showed that the survival time of the authoritarian regime increases if the indicators of governance quality are high. The author tackles the issue of quantitative measurement of resource dependence and argues in favor of using the share of natural resources rents in GDP as such indicator. The article also identifies the limitations and possibilities of Cox regression in analyzing the survival capacity of autocracies and makes suggestions for improving the proportional hazards model. DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2018-4-122-139References
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