EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AUTOCRACIES
Keywords:
executive constraints, power personalization, political regimes, economic growth, autocraciesAbstract
Authoritarian regimes differ in the degree to which the leader is constrained in his ability to influence the decision-making process. It has been argued that an unlimited executive can either lead to adverse economic policy outcomes or improve economic performance. The paper reassesses the impact of executive constraints on economic performance. While most of the previous studies in this area focus on regime typologies, this research uses observable indicators of power personalization in 90 autocratic countries from 1960 to 2010 to estimate their impact on economic performance. The author considers power concentration, the range of powers available to chief executives and their ability to dismiss ministers as the indicators for measuring the leaders’ potential for influencing the decision-making process. It is concluded that the countries where the leaders can stay longer in office, have a possibility to change the cabinet unrestrictedly, and concentrate more power in their hands tend to be more opportunistic. The results imply that strong leaders establish such a power-sharing regime that allows them to act in a self-interest way. DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2018-4-106-121References
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