Parliament structure influence on socio-economic policy in Russin regions: empirical analysis

Authors

  • Евгения Митрохина/ Evgenia Mitrokhina NRU Higher School of Economics, Moscow
  • Евгений Ожегов Evgeniy Ozhegov NRU Higher School of Economics, Perm http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6733-4150

Keywords:

parliament, political cycles, partisan theory, parliament ideology, regional budget, social expenditures, regression analysis

Abstract

The research analyzes the impact of the parliament structure on budget expenditures in Russian regions. According to the partisan theory, political parties represented in parliaments carry out a political course in concordance with their ideology. Thus, politics influences economy.  Using regression analysis, in our paper we test the hypothesis that left political parties increase social expenditures. We use dataset containing information from 2005 to 2013 about actual regional budget expenditures for constructing index of political ideology based on left/right scale. It has been found out that that left parliaments increase social expenditures by reducing a share of spending on the national economy. Moreover, increase in social expenditures causes redistribution of money between different items of social spending DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2016-2-62-82  

Author Biographies

Евгения Митрохина/ Evgenia Mitrokhina, NRU Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Master Student

Евгений Ожегов Evgeniy Ozhegov, NRU Higher School of Economics, Perm

Senior Lecturer

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Published

2018-10-07

How to Cite

Evgenia Mitrokhina Е. М., & Evgeniy Ozhegov Е. О. (2018). Parliament structure influence on socio-economic policy in Russin regions: empirical analysis. Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, (2), 62–82. Retrieved from http://press.psu.ru/index.php/polit/article/view/1708