WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON LEADERS' POLITICAL SURVIVAL: AN ANALYTICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2025-4-144-153Keywords:
economic sanctions, economic sanction effectiveness, typology of economic sanctions, consequences of economic sanctions, political stability, political survival, selectorate theoryAbstract
In recent decades, economic sanctions have become an increasingly frequent and precise foreign policy tool, and the expansion of their types and application has prompted a reevaluation of their political consequences. There is still no consensus on the nature and factors through which economic sanctions influence the political survival of a country’s leaders, a central aspect of government stability. This article provides an analytical review of the research field to explore arguments concerning the relationship between sanctions and political survival. The discussion on assessing the effectiveness of economic sanctions in terms of political leaders’ survival remains highly relevant. Examination of key studies demonstrates that the consequences of sanctions for a political leader largely depend on the methods of their implementation. Moreover, the economic well-being of the target state positively influences a leader’s stability under sanctions, while the ability to retain power is also shaped by the size and structure of the selectorate and the winning coalition, as well as by the specific mechanisms of resource redistribution. This article continues the discussion on the consequences of economic sanctions and offers a new approach to considering the effectiveness of economic sanctions through their connection with the political survival of leaders.References
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