ОСЕДЛЫЕ БАНДИТЫ И ПОЛИТИКИ НА ПОДРАБОТКЕ: ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ БИЗНЕСА И ВЛАСТИ В РОССИЙСКИХ РЕГИОНАХ

Авторы

  • Денис Стремоухов / D. А. Stremoukhov Национальный исследовательский университет "Высшая школа экономики", Санкт-Петербург http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2515-0844

Ключевые слова:

регионы России, региональная политика, региональный бизнес, бизнес в политике, корпоративная политическая стратегия, фирмы с политическими связями

Аннотация

Бизнес является важным политическим игроком во всем мире в силу обладания автономными от го-сударства ресурсами, собственными интересами и значимостью для обеспечения экономического развития и социальной стабильности. Россия и её регионы не являются исключением: бизнес и государство на разных уровнях связаны сложной системой взаимодействий и неопатримониальных обменов, а во многих регионах местный бизнес является значимой политической силой, способной не только успешно лоббировать свои интересы, но и влиять на электоральные исходы. В статье обозреваются результаты исследований российского регионального бизнеса и власти. Исследования на российском эмпирическом материале внесли заметный вклад в понимание прямого политического участия бизнесменов, что во многом стало возможно благодаря уникальным российским политическим и институциональным условиям. Кроме того, исследователям удалось показать сложную картину взаимозависимости бизнеса и государства и подчеркнуть ограниченную применимость упрощенных схем к пониманию отношений между бизнесом и государством в авторитарных режимах. DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2021-1-119-129

Биография автора

Денис Стремоухов / D. А. Stremoukhov, Национальный исследовательский университет "Высшая школа экономики", Санкт-Петербург

старший преподаватель Департамента политологии и международных отношений, аналитик Центра сравнительных исследований власти и управления

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Опубликован

2021-04-23

Как цитировать

D. А. Stremoukhov Д. С. /. (2021). ОСЕДЛЫЕ БАНДИТЫ И ПОЛИТИКИ НА ПОДРАБОТКЕ: ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ БИЗНЕСА И ВЛАСТИ В РОССИЙСКИХ РЕГИОНАХ. Вестник Пермского университета. Политология / Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, 15(1), 119–129. извлечено от http://press.psu.ru/index.php/polit/article/view/4505