HOW FUNDAMENTAL TREATY REFORMS AFFECT THE SPEED OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2024-4-153-166Keywords:
European Union, decision-making, legislative process, decision-making duration, Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, survival analysis, Cox modelAbstract
The article adds to the discussion about how EU treaty reforms affect the duration of the legislative process. Two methods are used to show the impact of the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties - interrupted time series analysis and survival analysis (Cox regression). They have been applied to empirical data consisting of EU secondary law directives and regulations. A major feature of this study is its focus on differentiating legislative and implementing acts, reducing the risk of conflating the analysis due to differences in their adoption processes. The research design helps us disentangle the treaties effects from effects of other institutional and structural parameters of the EU decision-making process. It is shown that the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties have different effects on legislative efficiency. The Lisbon treaty had a profound effect, increasing the speed of decision making. This was not due to the scope of the ordinary legislative procedure being widened, rather it was due to the reform of qualified majority rules in the Council. The Amsterdam and Nice treaties had no clear effect. It seems that two key elements of the reform - the increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council and the strengthening of the legislative role of the European Parliament - have had opposite effects on the length of the legislative process, offsetting each other.References
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