MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE IN 1985: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES

Abstract

The article is devoted to the first year when Mikhail Gorbachev was the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the perception of his personal qualities and political attitudes by the elites of the United States of America and the Republic of France. The author attempts to clarify the impressions of the new Soviet leader among the leaders of the United States and France, to establish what expectations were experienced during this year in Washington and in Paris in connection with the change of leadership in the USSR, and to determine whether there was a problem in the relations in 1985. In the process of working on the article, the methods of imagology, modern comparative studies, as well as traditional historical-genetic and historical-typological methods were used. The American administration and the government of France – one of the key allies of the United States in NATO, had a well-thought-out and coordinated strategy of action against the USSR, aimed at achieving victory in the Cold War. In 1985, there were no significant changes neither in US-Soviet nor French-Soviet relations. The US-French dialogue concerning the agenda of bilateral relations and relations with the USSR did not undergo serious changes as well. Western leaders considered it premature to draw conclusions about Gorbachev as a new leader and reformer. Too little time has passed since he took the top position, and Western politicians were not ready to assess Gorbachev's behavior on the international arena and the possible consequences of the change of power in the USSR. Neither the United States nor France expected that, in the coming years, the USSR would face an avalanche of crisis phenomena that would lead to the collapse of the country and the end of the Cold War. In the plans of the American and French administrations, the motives of cooperation and dialogue continued to occupy a significant place. Both Washington and Paris were in no hurry to change their strategies, because they assumed that Gorbachev, like all the leaders of the USSR before him, was a product of the Soviet system, and he would stick to the course of his predecessors.