Building a Model of Electronic Voting Protocol With the Possibility of Verification of the Result by Voters

Abstract

This article proposes a model of electronic voting protocol, with the possibility of monitoring the result by the voters. The central idea of such a model is the emergence of a mechanism for linking electronic ballots with the results of voting in a single chain, with the help of cryptographic transformations, based on cryptographic systems with a public key. Such a mechanism prevents "superfluous" ballots from appearing, makes it possible to track the result of one's vote by a particular voter in this chain, and makes it impossible to make an incorrect vote count, without violating the integrity of the chain. Three electronic voting protocols were examined: the Fujioka–Okamoto–Ohta protocol, the protocol with one central commission based on the ANDOS protocol, and the protocol with one central commission based on the blind signature. The protocols were investigated for merits and demerits, as well as for the possibility of modification to add new features. The optimal protocol was selected to include a mechanism for linking votes into a single chain. As a result, a new electronic voting system based on a protocol with the Central Election Commission based on a blind signature was developed. A scheme explaining the operation of this system is given.