NON-INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST REGULATION: THE ROLE OF TRUST AND INDIVIDUALISM

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2024-1-41-49

Keywords:

conflict of interest; corruption; anti-corruption policy; public service; effectiveness of public policy; World Values Survey; multiple regression analysis

Abstract

Anti-corruption policy should not only identify the facts of corruption and punish the crimes already committed, but also introduce preventive measures to minimize the risks of corrupt behavior, especially a system of regulating conflicts of interest. The latter includes measures ranging from prohibiting or restricting the receipt of gifts by officials, to introducing a cooling-off period when a civil servant enters the private sector. Generally, all measures of conflict of interest regulations can be attributed to three basic models: compliance-based model, integrity-based model, and adaptation model, which will also be considered in the article. This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of conflict-of-interest regulatory models through the prism of non-institutional factors. To this end, data from the World Values Survey was used as a source for this study, specifically data on levels of individualism and trust in society. The results of the multiple regression analysis partially supported the hypothesis that the professional culture model copes better with conflict-of-interest regulation than other models in conditions of high levels of trust and individualism. The results, however, provide a basis for further research to develop a more comprehensive strategy for regulating conflicts of interest based on various external and internal conditions.

Author Biography

K. A. Krikunov, HSE University

Ph.D. student at Doctoral School of Political Science

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Published

2024-04-12

How to Cite

Krikunov К. А. (2024). NON-INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST REGULATION: THE ROLE OF TRUST AND INDIVIDUALISM . Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, 18(1). https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2024-1-41-49