PATRONAGE AS A KEY PREDICTOR OF GOVERNOR’S ROTATION: FACTORS OF STABILITY OF THE HEADS OF RUSSIAN REGIONS AFTER THE RETURN OF THE GOVERNOR'S ELECTIONS IN 2012

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2022-4-73-84

Keywords:

Russian politics; regional policy; Russian governors; patronage

Abstract

The return of direct gubernatorial elections in 2012 did not lead to an increase in the autonomy of regional heads - on the contrary, the federal center only strengthened control over the staffing of regional executive power. Moreover, the rotation is only growing despite the positive dynamics of «United Russia» representation and support in the federal and regional legislatures. In this regard, the thesis that the good results of the "party of power" ensure the stability of governors (Reuter, Robertson, 2012) needs to be revised. The study aimed to identify the key predictors influencing the rotation of Russian governors after the return of direct elections of the heads of Russian regions. Using logistic regression analysis on panel data, the high significance of patronage as a predictor of the resignations of Russian governors from 2012 to 2020 was revealed. The hypothesis was confirmed that the higher the degree of patronage of the governor, the lower the likelihood that the head of the region will leave his post or not be promoted in the formal hierarchy. It turned out that the loyalty expressed in the results of the "United Russia" in the regional and federal elections is no longer a key predictor of the rotation of governors.

Author Biography

Yu. А. Balandin, NRU HSE, Russia, Moscow

Lecturer at the Department of Politics and Management, Doctoral Student

References

Лапина, Н. Ю. (2006) ‘Центр-регионы» в постсоветской России: история, механизмы взаимодействия, сценарии будущего’, Политическая экспертиза: ПО-ЛИТЭКС, 2(2), cc. 85‒98. [Lapina, N. Yu. (2006) ‘Center-Regions in Post-Soviet Russia: History, Interaction Mech-anisms, Future Scenarios’ [Tsentr-regiony» v postsovetskoi Rossii: istoriya, mekhanizmy vzaimodeistviya, stsenarii budushchego], Politicheskaya ekspertiza: POLITEKS, 2(2), pp. 85‒98. (In Russ.)].

Ортунг, Р. (2010) ‘Отношения между Центром и периферией’, Pro et contra, 14(4‒5), сс. 80‒94. [Ortung, R. (2010) ‘Relations between the Center and the Periphery’ [Otnosheniya mezhdu Tsentrom i perifer-iei], Pro et contra, 14(4‒5), pp. 80‒94. (In Russ.)].

Петров, Н. (2012) ‘От федерации корпораций к федерации регионов’, Pro et contra, 4‒5, cc. 101‒118. [Petrov, N. (2012) ‘From a federation of corporations to a federation of regions’ [Ot federatsii kor-poratsii k federatsii regionov], Pro et con-tra, 4‒5, pp. 101‒118. (In Russ.)].

Ратленд, П. (2016) ‘Постсоветские элиты Рос-сии’, Polis: Journal of Political Studies, 3, сс. 55‒72. [Rutland, P. (2016) ‘Rus-sia’s Post-Soviet Elite’ [Postsovetskie jelity Rossii], Polis: Journal of Political Studies, 3, pp. 55‒72. (In Russ.)].

Флягин, А. М. (2020) ‘Как изменился портрет российского губернатора: анализ биографий глав регионов. 1991‒2019 гг.’, Вестник Пермского университета. Серия: Политология, 14(1), cc. 29‒39. [Flyagin, A. M. (2020) ‘How the portrait of the Russian governor has changed: an analysis of the biographies of the heads of regions. 1991‒2019’ [Kak izmenilsya portret rossiiskogo gubernatora: analiz bi-ografii glav regionov. 1991‒2019 gg.], Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Seriya: Politologiya, 14(1), pp. 29‒39, DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2020-1-29-39. (In Russ.)].

Туровский, Р. Ф. (2009) ‘Практики назначения губернаторов: инерция и радикализм в политике центра’, Журнал политической философии и социологии политики «Полития. Анализ. Хроника. Прогноз», 2, cc. 72‒89. [Turovsky, R. F. (2009) ‘Appointment practices of governors: in-ertia and radicalism in the policy of the center’ [Praktiki naznacheniya guberna-torov: inertsiya i radikalizm v politike tsentra], Zhurnal politicheskoi filosofii i sotsiologii politiki «Politiya. Analiz. Khronika. Prognoz», 2, pp. 72‒89, DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2009-53-2-72-89. (In Russ.)].

Baturo, A. & Elkink, J. A. (2016) ‘Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32(1), pp. 75‒98, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2015.1032532.

Gandhi, J. (2008) Political institutions under dictatorship. Cambridge University Press, DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510090.

Geddes, B. (2005) ‘Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes?’, In annual meeting of the American Political Science As-sociation, pp. 456‒471.

Golosov, G. V. & Tkacheva, T. (2018) ‘Let my people run: Preelection resignations of Russia’s governors, 2013–2015’, Prob-lems of Post-Communism, 65(4), pp. 243‒252, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2017.1351305.

Gorokhov, V. (2017) ‘I will survive: regional chief executives (governors) and the principal-agent paradigm after the aboli-tion of gubernatorial elections in Russia’, Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Eu-rope, 25(1), pp. 103‒115, DOI: 10.1080/0965156X.2017.1346054.

Hale, H. E. (2014) ‘Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspec-tive’, Cambridge University Press, pp. 453‒455, DOI: 10.21226/T20P4R.

Hale, H. E. (2017) ‘Russian patronal politics be-yond Putin’. Daedalus, 146(2), pp. 30‒40. URL: https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/DAED_a_00432#fn4 (дата обращения: 10.05.2020), DOI: 10.1162/DAED_a_00432.

Ivanov, Y., & Petrov, N. (2021) ‘Transition to a New Model of Russian Governors’ Ap-pointments as a Reflection of Regime Transformation’, Russian Politics, 6(2), pp. 153‒184, DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00602001.

Lodola, G. (2010) ‘The Politics of Subnational Coalition Building. Gubernatorial Redistributive Strategies in Argentina and Bra-zil’, University of Pittsburgh, 411 p.

Magaloni, B. (2008) ‘Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule’, Comparative political studies, 41(4‒5), pp. 715‒741, DOI: 10.1177/0010414007313124.

Reuter, O. J. (2010) ‘The politics of dominant party formation: United Russia and Rus-sia's governors’, Europe-Asia Studies, 62(2), pp. 293‒327, DOI: 10.1080/09668130903506847.

Reuter, O. J. & Robertson, G. B. (2012) ‘Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Russian gubernato-rial appointments’, The Journal of poli-tics, 74(4), pp. 1023‒1037, DOI: 10.1017/S0022381612000631.

Reuter, O. J., Buckley, N., Shubenkova, A. & Garifullina, G. (2016) ‘Local elections in authoritarian regimes: An elite-based theory with evidence from Russian mayoral elections’, Comparative political studies, 49(5), pp. 662‒697, DOI: 10.1177/0010414015626439.

Rochlitz, M., Kulpina, V., Remington, T. & Ya-kovlev, A. (2015) ‘Performance incentives and economic growth: regional offi-cials in Russia and China’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 56(4), pp. 421‒445, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2015.1089411.

Sharafutdinova, G. (2013) ‘Getting the «Dough» and Saving the Machine: Lessons from Tatarstan’, Demokratizatsiya, 21(4). pp. 507‒529.

Sharafutdinova, G. & Turovsky, R. (2017) ‘The politics of federal transfers in Putin’s Russia: regional competition, lobbying, and federal priorities’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(2), pp. 161‒175, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2016.1163826.

Slider, D. (2010) ‘How united is United Russia? Regional sources of intra-party conflict’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transi-tion Politics, 26(2), pp. 257‒275, DOI: 10.1080/13523271003712617.

Snegovaya, M. & Petrov, K. (2022) ‘Long Soviet shadows: the nomenklatura ties of Putin elites’, Post-Soviet Affairs, pp. 1‒20, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2062657.

Wolfe, S. D. & Müller, M. (2018) ‘Crisis neopatrimonialism: Russia’s new political economy and the 2018 World Cup’, Problems of post-communism, 65(2), pp. 101‒114, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2018.1429934.

Yakovlev, A. & Aisin, A. (2019) ‘Friends or Foes? The Effect of Governor-Siloviki In-teraction on Economic Growth in Rus-sian Regions’, Russian Politics, 4(4), pp. 520‒545, DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00404005.

Published

2022-12-27

How to Cite

Balandin Ю. А. (2022). PATRONAGE AS A KEY PREDICTOR OF GOVERNOR’S ROTATION: FACTORS OF STABILITY OF THE HEADS OF RUSSIAN REGIONS AFTER THE RETURN OF THE GOVERNOR’S ELECTIONS IN 2012. Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, 16(4). https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2022-4-73-84