EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS OF POST-SOVIET STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2025-4-64-73

Keywords:

budgetary process, index of Legislative Budget Institutions, post-Soviet countries, executive-legislative relations, Open Budget Survey, parliamentary oversight

Abstract

The budgetary process vividly illustrates the political struggle over the redistribution of state resources, making the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches especially visible and open to comparative analysis. The post-Soviet space offers a compelling field for studying interbranch relations, where a shared institutional legacy has produced diverse models of budgetary interaction. This article compares the prerogatives of legislative and executive bodies to assess their relative influence in the budgetary process. Methodologically, the study applies J. Wehner’s Index of Legislative Budget Institutions—adapted to post-Soviet specificities—which evaluates six parameters: parliamentary amendment powers, consequences of non-approval, executive flexibility in execution, time for legislative review, the role of specialized committees, and access to independent budget information. To calculate the indicators, the study draws on data from the Open Budget Survey (International Budget Partnership), the Inter-Parliamentary Union database, as well as national legislation and official documents. The results of the empirical analysis across fifteen post-Soviet countries reveal substantial variation in the level of parliamentary oversight of the budgetary process. This variation largely depends on the characteristics of the political regime, the degree of parliamentary institutionalization, the prevalence of informal decision-making practices, and the broader international context.

Author Biographies

Ilya Pomiguev, INION RAS, Moscow, Russia.

Candidate of Sci. (Polit. Sci.), Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications. Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia. researcher, Department of Political Science,

Dmitrii Fedoseikin, HSE University, Moscow, Russia.

Ph.D. Student, School of Politics and Governance, Faculty of Social Sciences

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Published

2026-01-12

How to Cite

Pomiguev И. А., & Fedoseikin Д. И. (2026). EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS OF POST-SOVIET STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. Bulletin of Perm University. Political Science, 19(4), 64–73. https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2025-4-64-73

Issue

Section

Political institutions, processes, technologies