Radicalization of the problem of epistemological relativism (argument «for»)

PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

The author of the article shows the difficulties in defining the problem of relativism, which expresses itself through the willingness declared by its supporters to abandon the question of truth. Since such readiness is unprecedented in the history of philosophy, the recognition of its solidness implies profound changes in the foundations of Western philosophy. An example of such changes can be the change in the ratio of absolute and relative, implied by the very literal meaning of the concept of «relativism», when the latter remains by itself. On the one hand, the doubt about the possibility of such a change strengthens the position of the opponents of relativism, who insist that there can be no relative without connection with the absolute. But on the other hand, in modern philosophy, a change in the status of the absolute is already being discussed, as a result of which it can no longer perform its former functions in cognition. Thus, what appears to be an «in-demand» idea in the speculative realism of K. Meyasu and the constructive realism of E. Agazzi is the idea about a potentially infinite reality as nonactualized transfinite, which is the result of a rethinking by modern philosophy of previous ideas about the absolute. The author of the article shows that such a change in the status of the absolute is precisely due to the changes in the possibilities of cognition noted by relativism, when some of them are lost (the possibility of speaking about truth in cognition), and others arise (the possibility of statements assumed by relativism that exclude each other according to the law of non-contradiction). The author shows that the possibility of radicalization of the problem of epistemological relativism associated with potential infinity is assumed even by those approaches (relationism), on the basis of which, on the contrary, philosophers seek to smooth out the problem or exclude it altogether, but which turn out to be even more vulnerable. In conclusion, the author points out the prospects of modern epistemology associated with the anthropic cosmological principle.