«Kaleidoscope» of feminist epistemologies
PHILOSOPHY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2022-2-197-207Keywords:
feminist epistemology, intersectional approach, epistemic injustice, epistemic advantage, epistemic ignorance, gaslighting, hermeneutic gapAbstract
The paper explores the ideas of feminist epistemologies in the 21st century: skepticism about objectivity, intersectional approach, epistemic injustice, etc. The author investigates the concepts of a hermeneutic gap, gaslighting and meta-ignorance, and gives the implications of these terms in higher education. The term «feminist epistemologies» is used in the paper in the plural since the attempts of oppressed groups to return the value of their own experience cannot be manifested in the existence of the only one universal epistemology. Rethinking the concepts of «knowledge», «knowing» with regard to women, disabled people, representatives of different races, sexual minorities becomes the core for the development of trans-epistemology, queer-epistemology, creep-epistemology, epistemology of resistance, epistemology of ignorance, etc. A particular contribution of feminist epistemologies is the attention to values and vested interests of privileged and oppressed groups in the sphere of knowledge production, which allows expanding the use of the concepts of epistemic injustice, epistemic advantage, and epistemic ignorance. The author raises a question: if power can lead to epistemic ignorance, while oppression, in turn — to epistemological advantage, does it mean that knowers from marginalized groups have the most complete knowledge? While there are many different research positions, none of the feminist epistemologies puts forward such a simplistic understanding of the connection between power and knowledge. The author argues that the relationship between knowledge and power cannot be described in such a way that the value of one’s knowledge will increase while the power of oppressed groups will decrease. The study shows that feminist epistemologies are a «kaleidoscope» of alternative or «marginal» epistemologies.References
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