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FROM PAN-TURKISM TO XINJIANG SEPARATISM: AN ANALYSIS OF TURKIC FACTOR

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Abstract

The conflict caused by cultural differences is one of the reasons for the emergence and development of Pan-Turkism and Xinjiang separatism, and there is a clear connection between them. This article aims to answer two questions: what is the common ground for the association between Pan-Turkism and Xinjiang separatism and for the cultural differences that drive the emergence and development of the two? The research shows the "Turkic factor" to be a common foundation. The author argues that the Turkic factor is the socio-cultural basis that promotes the emergence and development of both Pan-Turkism and Xinjiang separatism. First, the Turkic factor is the premise and condition for the emergence, spread and three transformations in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey of Pan-Turkism. Second, the Turkic factor is the cultural basis of Xinjiang separatism, and it is constantly politicized and instrumentalized by Xinjiang separatism. Third, the Uyghurization of Turkic factor and Pan-Turkism is no doubt an inevitable consequence of the development of separatism, however, they are clearly different in the process, causes, methods, and results of Uyghurization. Finally, after being shaped by Xinjiang separatist forces, the content of the Turkic factor has been divided into two parts in Xinjiang.

Keywords: Pan-Turkism; Xinjiang separatism; Turkic factor; Uyghurization.

Research on Pan-Turkism began in the 1920s. At that time, it was mainly based on the official ideology of the Soviet academic community who criticized it as one kind of bourgeois nationalism. The representative work was published in 1931, "Introduction to Russian Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism." Such an approach continued until the mid-1980s and profoundly affected the Chinese academic community. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian academia has mainly studied Pan-Turkism and its new manifestations from the perspective of national security and unity, such as the main elements of Pan-Turkism and its evolution, the threat of Pan-Turkism to Russia, the "new Pan-Turkism", the integration of Turkic-speaking countries, and the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States - Turkic Council (Мухамметдинов, 1996; Гилязов, 2002; Червонная, Гилязов, Горошков, 2003; Бурашникова, 2013; Вартањян, 2015), etc. Armenia is an ally of Russia in dealing with Pan-Turkism. Armenians were the direct victims of the Ottoman Empire's implementation of Pan-Turkism and they have taken a negative stance on Pan-Turkism and any relevant phenomena, as represented by the book "Pan-Turkism from Ankara to Baku", published in 1928 and reprinted in 1991 and 2013 (Шаран, 2013).

The Chinese government and academia have always been critical of Pan-Turkism, due to the threat of separatism in Xinjiang. In the early days of reform and opening up, the Chinese government conducted a systematic study of the "double panism" (it refers to the Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism) and got many results (Ян Фарэн, 1997; Чэнь Чао, 2000). In recent years, many Chinese scholars have achieved new results in the study of Pan-Turkism, notably its influence on separatism in Xinjiang (Ни Пэйцян, 2002; Пан Жипин, 2004; Мин Цзин, 2006; Цзань Тао, 2011; Тянь Вэйцзян, 2018). On the whole, policy orientation has an obvious effect on the study of Pan-Turkism in Russia, Armenia and Chinese academia. Most Chinese scholars emphasize the role of "double panism", and extend its original concept to the whole process of the emergence and development of Xinjiang separatism when they study the emergence and development of Xinjiang separatism (Ян Фарэн, 2000; Ли Шэн, 2003). In recent years, several scholars have attempted to break away from this line of thought (Ни Пэйцян, 2002; Ци Шуньли, 2011). However, they don't

systematically study the impact of Pan-Turkism on separatism in Xinjiang in various ways in different historical periods.

Turkey, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are on the other side of the study of Pan-Turkism and related issues. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Turkish government tried to avoid using terms with pan-Turkic connotations but instead used the terms "Turkic world", "Turkic-Islamic Unity", "Turkic Integration", etc. The academic circles of Kazakhstan mainly study Pan-Turkism with its related contents from two directions: one is the role of Pan-Turkism in the formation of Kazakh national state identity, including the emergence and development of Pan-Turkism, the Jadid movement, activities of the Tartar diaspora; and the other is to study the integration of Turkic-speaking countries and the evolution of Kazakhstan's foreign policy (Хостлер, 2006; Казиев, 2015; Альжанова, 2015). In the academic circles of Azerbaijan, the study of Pan-Turkism has become more active (Нуриева, 2014; Бабаян, 2011; Силантьев, 2015).

In recent years, some European and American scholars had increasingly emphasized the role of cultural differences in studying the stability of Xinjiang (Smith, 2002; Arienne, 2005; Millward, 2004). These studies lay the foundation for the author's concept of the "Turkic factor". On the whole, studies have been relatively generalized on the diffusion process and development of Pan-Turkism in different countries and regions, without paying attention to its changes in localized development, and with insufficient attention to its interaction with local thought after its introduction into Turkey and Xinjiang, China, especially the lack of research on its evolution in relation to separatism in Xinjiang.

What's Turkic factor?

The author believes that among the Russian Tatars, Ottoman-Turks and Xinjiang inhabitants, there was a social and cultural basis with a high degree of similarity, which was earlier than Pan-Turkism. The most obvious manifestation was the Turk-Muslim national cultural identity. So, what is the foundation of social and cultural? In the author's opinion, it is the "Turkic factor".

Firstly, the Turkic factor is not equal to Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkism is a cultural-political goal and a strategy and tactics to achieve this goal by a few Turkic elites, whereas the Turkic factor refers to the common features of Turkic-speaking nations. After politicization, Pan-Turkism has a clear political purpose, whereas the Turkic factor does not, so it is easy to be used by various forces. However, they are linked in a variety of ways, such as content composition and development processes.

Secondly, the Turkic factor is essentially a socio-cultural foundation that includes common features shared by Turkic-speaking nations in terms of language, religion, history, psychology, territory, etc. However, certain elites have added false elements to it for political purposes, such as an elongated history, an enlarged space, an increased population, an exaggerated influence and honor, etc. Thus, the Turkic factor consists of two parts, one that is historically formed and objective, a neutral concept, and the other that is false, enlarged and artificially created. Complex content makes Turkic factor have great plasticity.

Thirdly, the Turkic factor takes Turkey as the core in a considerable sense, especially in the eyes of Uyghurs, because Turkey is the most populous and influential country in the Turkic language world, and its understanding and evaluation of all aspects of the Turkic language have an impact on the consciousness of other Turkic people. In particular, the extroversion of the centripetal force of Uyghur culture makes it easier for Uyghurs to enhance themselves by attaching external forces - the influence of Turkey. This is also an important reason why Turkic factor constitutes an important part of Xinjiang foreign relations.

Fourthly, the emergence of Turkic factor in Xinjiang is the result of Turkization and Islamization, but Pan-Turkism has played a strong catalytic role in the process of the development of Xinjiang Turkic identity from recessive to dominant. At the same time, Xinjiang separatism based on Turkic factor has also absorbed the nutrition of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. However, it must be made clear that "double panism" is the external factor for the emergence and development of separatism in Xinjiang, and the Turkic factor is the cultural basis of separatism in Xinjiang.

Fifth, Turkic factor has been instrumentalized many times in history. On the issue of Xinjiang, the Turkic factor has been exploited by at least three forces. During the period of the Republic of China, the Soviet Union intervened in Xinjiang affairs by means of Turkic factor; after the Cold War, Turkey sought its leadership in the Turkic-speaking world through Turkic factor; the separatist forces in Xinjiang used Turkic factor to propagate Turkic residents (Uyghurs are the main component) in their territory, which was different from the Han people in history, culture and religion, thus undermining their recognition of China and seeking the support abroad and help of the Turkic language world and damage the image of China.

Finally, the Turkic factor is the most important foundation of Uyghur society and culture. But in Xinjiang separatism, the Turkic factor is more used by the Uyghur minority elite (mainly a minority of intellectuals). When they make use of Turkic factor, they often exaggerate some contents of Turkic factor, or even add some spurious ingredients, in order to enhance the confidence and superiority of the recipients and make them think that the split is reasonable and feasible psychologically.

To sum up, when discussing the Turkic countries and regions in the hinterland of Eurasia, it is proper to use the Turkic factor broadly defined, referring to the common features of the Turkic-speaking nations in terms of language, religion, history, psychology and territory; when talking about Xinjiang, it is fit to use the Turkic factor narrowly defined, specifically referring to the outward-looking ethnic cultural identity of Xinjiang Turkic residents, formed on the basis of Turkicization and Islamization, with the common features of the Turkic-speaking nations as the main content, as well as some elements that are constantly exaggerated, distorted and appended by a few elite Uyghur figures.

Turkic factor as the premise and foundation for the emergence, spread and three transformations of Pan-Turkism

For a long time, the term "Turkic" was fading into oblivion until the 19th century when European scholars coincidentally uncovered the remains of ancient Turkic-speaking nations. With the rise of Turkology, the Turkic-speaking nations were reconnected and their historical memory was reawakened. These rediscovered Turkic elements were the cultural basis of the later Pan-Turkism, which emerged among the Russian Tatars and flourished in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.

In the mid-19th century, when Turkology emerged in Europe and Tanzimat Reform in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Turkic-speaking nations faced the pressure of assimilation from the Pan-Slavic culture, which prompted the awakening of Russian Turkic Muslims. In this process, Ismail Gasprins, a Tatar, brewed Pan-Turkism in the late 19th century. At this time, Pan-Turkism was still at the stage of cultural revival and could be called 'cultural Pan-Turkism'. Its activities were focused on the cultural spheres of language, publishing and education, and it sought to unite the Turkic-speaking nations of Russia and to achieve a cultural revival of the Turkic-speaking nations through Jadid education, which was essentially a vision of the cultural survival and development of the Turkic-speaking nations of Russia without political aims (Чжан Юйянь и др. 2018). On the basis of the Turkic factor, Pan-Turkism began to spread to neighboring countries and regions.

Pan-Turkism has undergone three important transformations in Anatolia Peninsula in more than one hundred years since it was introduced into the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Turkism was introduced at a time when the Ottoman Empire was in decline. In an attempt to rid itself of internal and external difficulties, Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism had become the straw that saved the Ottoman sultan's life, which meant that Pan-Turkism could not remain only at the cultural level. Pan-Turkism was favored by the ruling class of the Ottoman Empire by the efforts of Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, etc. During the reign of Young Turks, "Young Turks" vigorously promoted Pan-Turkism during their reign, which opened the way for the transformation of Pan-Turkism.

The first transformation of Pan-Turkism took place within the Ottoman Empire, not only transferring the political leadership and geographical center from the Tatar-dominated Turkic-speaking nations in Russian Empire to the Ottoman Turkish-centred Turkic-speaking world, but also beginning a phase of development of "political Pan-Turkism". For a long time in the 20th century, Pan-Turkic activity in Turkey was focused on the political sphere, unlike in Russia. The Turks combined Pan-Turkism with Grand Turanism, not only to integrate Ottoman society and achieve survival, but also to pursue the unity of the Turkic nations and establish a geopolitical leadership under the Ottoman Empire. In addition, during the First World War, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism combine to achieve a militarization (of Jihad) and an extramalization, and has the ideological content of anti-Russian.

The second transformation of Pan-Turkism took place during World War II and the Cold War afterwards, mainly within the Turkish political sphere. During World War II, Turkish Pan-Turkists colluded with German fascists in an attempt to create an alliance between the Turkish-dominated Turkic world and a German-dominated Europe, and it formed the roots of Pan-Turkist national extremism. The democratization of political life in Turkey after World War II created conditions for Pan-Turkism to enter the national political system. And, as the cold war began, Pan-Turkism in Turkey became an ideological tool of anti-Soviet and anti-communism in the Western camp (Ян Шы, 2014).

The third transformation of Pan-Turkism occurred in the 1990s. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, five new independent Turkic-speaking countries emerged in the central part of Eurasia. At the same time, with Russia's weakening and strategic contraction, a power vacuum emerged in the region, which Turkey was eager to fill with Pan-Turkism ties. After several attempts and failures, Turkey has had to retreat to the second-best option of pursuing its cultural influence in the region and return to "cultural Pan-Turkism", but this "return" is to a large extent the same in the field of activity (language, education, publishing, etc.) rather than a simple repetition of propaganda content. Turkey promotes the economic, cultural, political and military integration of the Turkic-speaking nations under its leadership and tries to avoid using the term Pan-Turkism, but instead uses hidden expressions such as "Eurasianism" and "Turkish-Islamic unified theory", in accordance with the geographical distribution and cultural characteristics of the Turkic factor.

Turkic factor has become the cultural basis and tool of Xinjiang separatism

Turkicization has injected Turkic factor into Uyghur culture, but for a long time Turkic factor has not been prominent in Uyghur culture, have been in a potential state, and have not been clearly reflected in the ideology of Uyghur people. After entering the 19th century, The Qing government's rule in Xinjiang was hit by internal peasant uprisings and external invasions by the Khan states, Britain and Russia. The authority of the central government was greatly weakened, and the weakening of the central authority in turn further stimulated the ambitions of the powers to intervene in the situation in Xinjiang. The weakening of the Qing government's ability to govern created the conditions for the rise of Uyghur elites. At the end of the 19th century, Pan-Turkism was introduced into Xinjiang. Turkic factor deep in Uyghur national memory was also awakened in this process and provided a suitable cultural environment for further penetration and spread of Pan-Turkism. The influence of entering Xinjiang is mainly reflected in: Stimulating and strengthening the national consciousness of the Uyghurs (Turkish-Muslim identity), strengthening the centrifugal force of the Uyghurs in culture, widening the culture gap between Uyghurs and Hans, and eventually becoming one of the main ideology in the early period of Xinjiang separatism. The reinforcement of cultural differences between Uyghurs and Hans led to the creation of separatism in Xinjiang, and the Turkic factor was an important basis for this difference. This shows that in the germination period of Xinjiang separatism, Turkism is in the dominant position, and Turkic factor is the cultural foundation.

After the Turkic factor was activated under the stimulation of Pan-Turkism, it began to become a cultural bond for Xinjiang separatism to seek sympathy and support from the Turkic world outside the country. Turkey also naturally became an important object for Xinjiang separatist forces to win support. During the "Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan" in 1933, the separatist forces actively sought international support from Turkey. The establishment of the "East Turkestan Republic" in 1944 was the result of the Soviet Union's efforts to form a pro-Soviet regime in Xinjiang in order to guarantee security and stability in Central Asia, which was also a Turkic-speaking region. At the same time, the existence of the Turkic factor in the border areas of China and the Soviet Union also provided the necessary cover and convenience for the Soviet Union to intervene in Xinjiang, plan to establish and support this separatist regime.

In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, Xinjiang separatism was hit by the people's democratic dictatorship. At the same time, it was at a low tide due to the restrictions of the domestic and foreign environment at that time. However, since reform and opening up, Xinjiang separatism has entered a period of rapid development, and its thinking and behavior has been presented a trend of violence and terrorization, which seriously threatens the social stability and economic development of Xinjiang. With the development of the international anti-terrorism struggle and the strengthening of the Chinese government's crackdown, Xinjiang separatist forces have gradually divided into violent and non-violent types. However, the differences are mainly reflected in the ways of achieving "Xinjiang independence" rather than goals. The violent type is represented by the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" and the non-violent type is represented by the "World Uyghur Congress". In contrast, the former prominent the Uyghur's Muslim nature more and it is more closely connected with the international Islamic extremist forces. The latter emphasizes the Turkic factor in Uyghur culture, and pays more attention to the development of "human rights", "democracy", "ethnic self-determination", "development rights of ethnic minority culture", and other flags to win the sympathy and support of the international community.

History has proved that compared with Pan-Turkism, Xinjiang separatist forces can politicize and instrumentalize for Turkic factor to achieve greater development. This is firstly because the Turkic factor is the foundation and bridge between Pan-Turkism and Xinjiang separatism. Secondly, because influence of Pan-Turkism in the international community is gradually diminishing, it is no longer a concept that attracts attention, and the Turkic factor will persist for a long time. Finally, in Xinjiang, Pan-Turkism was Uyghurized with the help of Turkic factor. Not only does it rely more on Xinjiang separatism, but it also loses its essence.

Uyghurization of Turkic factor and Pan-Turkism is an inevitable result of the development of separatism in Xinjiang

After the founding of New China in 1949, the separatist forces in Xinjiang either chose to abscond abroad or to stay dormant. Under the influence of the people's democratic dictatorship and communist ideology, Pan-Turkism was effectively cleaned up in Xinjiang. However, the reform and opening up provided a relaxed social environment for the reactivation of Xinjiang separatist forces. Due to the increase in external relations, Xinjiang separatist forces began to imitate Turkey's Pan-Turks, and changed the development mode of Pan-Turkism in Xinjiang, and began to use the Turkic factor to Uyghurize Pan-Turkism and make it subordinate to the development of Xinjiang separatism. This change is evident in the evolution of Xinjiang separatist cultural patterns.

Just as Xinjiang separatism develops in stages, there are also obvious characteristics of its cultural shaping in different stages. Taking the evolution of separatist cultural forms as an example, Xinjiang separatists use the Turkic factor to change their cultural forms from Pan-Turkism into a strengthened Uyghur cultural identity, and the Uyghurization of Turkic factor is both an objective need for Pan-Turkish and an important result of this process.

In the 1920s and 30s, under the influence of the Soviet Union and the leadership of the Sheng Shicai government, the "Uyghur" national title was formally established. At the same time, under the influence of Pan-Turkism, "Turkish people" "Turkish culture" "East Turkistan" "Tulan" began to prevail among the Uyghur national elites. These conditions had an important impact on the early cultural formation of Xinjiang separatism. Mohammed Amin's "History of East Turkestan" published in 1940 is a representative work of Xinjiang separatism during the Republic of China (Цянь Боцюань, 1999). From the standpoint of Pan-Turkism, Amin added a strong Pan-Turkish color to the cultural form of Xinjiang separatism. At the same time, the book tampered history with Xinjiang with a lot of false and forged content, strengthen the Turkic nature of Uyghur culture, and then find a historical basis for Uyghur people's national self-determination and independence.

In the early days of Reform and opening up, with the rise of the role of Turkic factor, there is more Turkic factor in Xinjiang separatist culture (Тургун Алмас, 1986;1988;1989). However, a considerable part of these contents are fake and non-scientific. In the three books, Turgun does not hesitate to use Turkic factor through distortions of history and associate the Uyghurs with the ancient nations such as the Huns, wantonly lengthen the history of the Uyghurs, expand the space for Uyghurs' activities, exaggerate the size of the Uyghur population, and promote the so-called "glorious" history of Uyghurs, developed civilization, and great military exploits. Illusive content was added to national pride, making up Uyghurs living in Xinjiang since ancient times, not recognizing the history of westward migration, and making the audience psychologically recognize the rationality and feasibility of Xinjiang separatist activities. Although the three books still draw lessons from the content of Turkism, there have been obvious changes. In the book, Turgun has replaced the construction of Turkic national identity with the construction of Uyghur national identity, and he still borrows some of the early clichés of Pan-Turkism. Taking advantage of the Turkic factor in Uyghur culture, Uyghur history is lengthened, and the distance between Uyghur and Han national culture is widened.

At present, the content and form of this part of the Turkic factor is increasing, impacting its true content. Moreover, the weakened international environment of Pan-Turkism has also promoted the Uyghurization of the Turkic factor, making it a cultural tool and component of Xinjiang. The biography of Rebiya Kadeer, former President of the world Uyghur association, "Dragon fighter", is a typical representative of the Uyghurization of Turkic factor (Kadeer, 2009). The separatist forces also hyped the history of the two "East Turkestan" regimes, shaping it into a national liberation movement initiated by the Turks, and deliberately concealing it as being manipulated and abandoned by the great powers. The fact that these two separatist regimes were built as a core element and spiritual symbol in the distorted history of

"Uyghurstan has never been a part of China". This shows that Xinjiang separatism relies on the Uyghurization of the Turkic factor to transform its culture and the form changed from Pan-Turkism to a strengthened Uyghur cultural identity.

Pan-Turkism and Turkic factor have caused the following effects in the Uyghurization of Xinjiang. Firstly, Pan-Turkism has lost the "pan" content in Xinjiang separatism, but these contents are historically Pan-Turkism in the cultural field and the essential characteristics of the political field, so it is no longer appropriate to continue to equate Xinjiang's Pan-Turkism with foreign Pan-Turkism or historical Pan-Turkism. Now, The Xinjiang separatist forces are no longer advocating a grand Turkic federation of Turkic-speaking nations, but the establishment of "Uyghurstan" or "Uyghur State", the name "East Turkestan" with Pan-Turkish nature has been reduced by separatist forces.

Secondly, the role of the Turkic factor in Xinjiang separatism has been significantly strengthened. At present, the propaganda of Xinjiang separatist forces on "Uyghurs", "Uyghurstan", "Uyghur Culture," and "Kashgar Culture" is increasingly replacing "Turkish People", "East Turkestan", "Turkish State", "Tulan", "Turkish Culture", etc. They have less interest in Pan-Turkism in Xinjiang, but the Turkic factor is still their passion, because they cannot win the sympathy and support of the Turkic world internationally without the cultural ties of Turkic factor, creating cultural isolation between Uyghurs and Hans, intensifying their ethnic conflicts, and seeking Xinjiang independence are also inseparable from the Turkic factor.

Finally, Uyghurization of Pan-Turkism and Turkic factor has provided a huge impetus to the development of Xinjiang separatism, making the separatist forces pay more attention to the instrumentalization and politicization of Uyghur culture in separatist acts, thereby enhancing the concealment and deceptiveness. In their efforts to bring Uyghurs closer to the psychological distance of Pan-Turkism and Turkic factor, the Xinjiang separatist forces also felt that abstract theoretical propaganda had limited effect and needed to use more vivid and concrete ways to win support, and it needs to be more visual and specific. In this way, they deliberately embody and visualize the main content carried by Pan-Turkism and Turkic factor to the Uyghurs, and start from the motivation to strengthen the culture differences between Uyghurs and Hans and create national barriers to process, reshape Uyghur culture and link cultural issues with political terms such as national equality, national self-determination, and national separation, so as to use "academic cloaks" to package their intentions of division and deceive the national feelings of the majority of residents.

Turkic factor in Xinjiang currently consists of two parts

In Xinjiang, the instrumentalization of Turkic factor by Pan-Turkists and Xinjiang separatist forces has changed the connotation and extension of the Turkic factor, which must be taken into account when defining the concept of Turkic factor and determining positions and attitudes towards them.

The study found that, as shown in Figure 1-(1), before the emergence of Pan-Turkism, the concept of Turkic factor was not clear or at least uncertain among the majority of Turkic-speaking nations in central Asia and Europe, and its outer edges were not clear. But it is certain that some characteristics of Turkic factor really exist not only in practice activities of Turkic-speaking nations but also in their subconsciousness. The emergence, development and spread of Pan-Turkism are all based on Turkic factor. At the same time, this process is also a process in which Pan-Turkist forces use a series of symbolic politics to shape the Turkic factor. Pan-Turkism is based on the Turkic factor, and in the process of its generation, the concept of Turkic factor is gradually strengthened, and the boundary between it and non-Turkish national culture is cleared. As the development of Pan-Turkism enters the political field, its relationship with Turkic factor begins to change. As shown in Figure 1-(3), on the one hand, due to the increase in the content of political demands, Pan-Turkism has been separated from the Turkic factor that takes Turkic ethnic culture as the carrier; on the other hand, the political requirements of Pan-Turkism are also infiltrated of Turkic factor in a certain process because the Turkic factor, while serving as the cultural basis of Pan-Turkism, began to be stuffed into the content created, exaggerated, imagined, and borrowed by pan-Turkish forces out of their own selfish desires. In recent years, the development of Pan-Turkism in the international community has contracted into the cultural field. This phenomenon not only illustrates the important role of Turkic factor in Pan-Turkism, but also indicates that the Turkic factor will continue to be further processed and shaped by Pan-Turkish forces.




Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the relationship between Turkic factor, Pan-Turkism, and Xinjiang separatism

The emergence and development of Xinjiang separatism are supported by a series of conditions, of which the introduction, stimulation of Pan-Turkism and the cultural base of Turkic factor are two important factors. During the germination period of Xinjiang separatism, it parasitized in the theoretical framework of Pan-Turkism and also relies on the cultural basis of the Turkic factor, so it constitutes a situation where Xinjiang separatism is basically surrounded by doubles as shown in Figure 1-(4). During this period, a Xinjiang separatist was first a Pan-Turkist (and / or Pan-Islamist), secondarily a Separatist in Xinjiang. During the formation of Xinjiang separatism, separatist forces not only used Pan-Turkism to carry out separatist activities in Xinjiang, but also emulated overseas Pan-Turkist forces. They began to distort, exaggerate and process the content of the Turkic factor, and fabricated "East Turkestan" as "the oldest, most famous, and earliest cultural developed independent country in the world" (Цянь Боцюань, 1999), preaching "Turkic politics", wantonly distorting ethnic relations in Xinjiang, and using terms such as "aggression" and "colonization" to describe China's development of Xinjiang, have caused considerable confusion among the local residents. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize: the forming process of Xinjiang separatism is also a process of its integration with Pan-Turkism and Turkic factor. However, since Xinjiang separatism originated from the combination of Pan-Turkism and Turkic factor in Xinjiang, its independence under any circumstances and any stage of development is relative. This conclusion is proved by later history. During the stagnation period of Xinjiang separatism, although subject to domestic and foreign circumstances, the fabrication of Turkic factor by Xinjiang separatism and Pan-Turkism has been restrained to a certain extent, and their connection with the Turkic factor has decreased, but there is still a clear overlap. These overlaps constitute not only the cultural basis for their continued existence and development in Xinjiang, but also their transformation, processing, and distortion of the Turkic factor and fill the most serious parts. As shown in Figure 1-(7), these overlaps have expanded after separatism in Xinjiang has entered a rapid development. At the same time, the development of Pan-Turkism in Xinjiang has completely served the needs of Xinjiang separatism, and the separatist forces have compressed the core of the Turkic factor inside and outside Xinjiang, which is the "Uyghurization" mentioned by the author. Now, in terms of self-knowledge, Xinjiang separatists are completely different from those in the germination period of separatism, and they have become Separatists first and then Pan-Turkists (and / or Pan-Islamists).

Conclusion

Cultural differences are a widespread social phenomenon in the development of human societies. Different cultures may live together harmoniously or clash with each other, and coexistence or conflict depends to a large extent on how people perceive and deal with cultural differences. One of the reasons for the emergence and development of Pan-Turkism and Xinjiang separatism lies in the conflicts arising from cultural differences. The common basis of such cultural differences is Turkic factor.

While the Turkic factor was a prerequisite and condition for the emergence, spread and transformation of Pan-Turkism, Ottoman-Turkey has been the central region in the evolution of Pan-Turkism. It was under the influence and strong impetus of Ottoman-Turkey that Pan-Turkism underwent three important transformations. Pan-Turkism was used not only by the Ottoman Empire to save its dying Empire, but also by the Turkish Republic as an important tool to pursue its foreign policy and realize its national interests. In other words, the instrumental value of Pan-Turkism was much higher than its ideological value. At the same time, the trajectory of Pan-Turkism is clearly correlated with the changing situation in central Eurasia due to the geopolitical distribution of Turkic factor.

Whether it is the cultural basis from which Xinjiang separatism emerged or the set of social factors that influenced its development, they all point, without exception, to ethnic cultural differences based on Turkic factor. At the same time, since the main supporters of Xinjiang separatism were a minority of Uyghurs, Xinjiang separatism was bound to be more Uyghur in character in its development. The Uyghurization of the Turkic factor and Pan-Turkism is the inevitable result of the development of Xinjiang separatism, but in this process the causes, manner and resulting outcomes of the Uyghurization of the Turkic factor and Pan-Turkism are distinctly different. What can be observed is that the Uyghurization of Pan-Turkism stems from two things: firstly, the objective requirement of localized development; and secondly, the emulation of the Turkish Pan-Turkic development model by the separatist forces in Xinjiang. The Uyghurization of Pan-Turkism was achieved through the use of Turkic elements, which, firstly, further increased the status and role of Turkic elements in Xinjiang separatism, secondly, made Pan-Turkism in Xinjiang lose its 'pan' content and essence, so that it eventually became subordinated to separatism in Xinjiang, and thirdly, led to Uyghurisation. In other words, the Uyghurization of the Turkic factor stemmed from the political imperative of separatism. The way in which the Uyghurization of the Turkic factor took place was by directly grafting the content of the Turkic factor onto Uyghur culture.

At present, after the instrumentalization and politicization of the separatist forces in Xinjiang, the Turkic factor is currently composed of two parts in Xinjiang. The first part is some common or similar characters that Turkic ethnic groups have formed in history, involving language, religion, region, etc.; the second part is that the Xinjiang separatist forces imitated overseas Pan-Turkist forces (mainly Turkish Pan-Turkist forces), adding or fabricating content to Turkic factor, or some contents are exaggerated and distorted. Under different historical circumstances and internal and external backgrounds, there is a relationship that can be transformed between each other under certain conditions. This is the Turkic factor in the narrow sense.

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ОТ ПАНТЮРКИЗМА ДО СИНЬЦЗЯНСКОГО СЕПАРАТИЗМА: АНАЛИЗ ТЮРКСКОГО ФАКТОРА

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Аннотация

Конфликт, вызванный культурными различиями, является одной из причин возникновения и развития Пантюркизма и Синьцзянского сепаратизма, между которыми существует неразрывная связь. В этой статье автор ищет ответы на два вопроса: какова общая основа ассоциации между Пантюркизмом и Синьцзянским сепаратизмом? Каковы общие основания для культурных различий, которые способствуют их возникновению и развитию? Автор называет эту общую основу "Тюркским фактором", чье значение имеет широкий и узкий смысл. Автор утверждает, что Тюркский фактор является социокультурной основой, способствующей возникновению и развитию как Пантюркизма, так и Синьцзянского сепаратизма, а также общей основой их взаимоотношений. Во-первых, Тюркский фактор представляет собой необходимую предпосылку и условие возникновения, распространения и трех преобразований Пантюркизма в Османской империи и Турции. Во-вторых, Тюркский фактор лежит в основе культуры Синьцзянского сепаратизма и постоянно политизируется и инструментализируется сепаратистскими силами Синьцзяна. В-третьих, уйгуризация Тюркского фактора и пантюркизма, несомненно, является необходимым следствием развития сепаратизма, но они явно различаются по причине, методам и результатам уйгуризации. Наконец, в синьцзяне содержание Тюркских факторов разделено на две части под влиянием сепаратистских сил.

Ключевые слова: пантюркизм; синьцзянский сепаратизм; тюркский фактор; уйгуризация.