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CARL SCHMITT'S LIBERALISM

A. Mishurin

Aleksandr Mishurin, Researcher,

Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.

E-mail: a.n.mishurin@iphras.ru (ORCID: 0000-0002-9942-772X. ResearcherID: N-2369-2016).

Abstract

In this work, I try to trace a clear, albeit preliminary connection between the thought of Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes through the pivotal work of the former called *The Concept of the Political*. I argue that, despite being one of the most profound critics of liberalism, Schmitt attacks it, staying, as Leo Strauss says, “in the horizon of liberalism”. That is to say, Schmitt, criticizing Hobbes’ heirs, simultaneously attempts to propose a continuation of Hobbes’ political theory; to show the possibility of a different development of Hobbes’ thought. The development concentrated around the collective-individual – “a specific entity of a people” united by an individual will – that is, the state, its properties, and its rights and not the human-individual. To flesh out this endeavor, I summarize Schmitt’s theoretical debt to Hobbes by showing that the key concepts of Schmitt’s thought like the political, man, enemy, state, sovereign, and others, are taken or reinterpreted from Hobbes. Thus Schmitt turns out to be in the cohort of Hobbes’ successors, who are usually branded as liberals.

Keywords: Schmitt; Hobbes; state; the political; enemy; man; liberalism.

Carl Schmitt is one of the most serious twentieth-century critics – if not the most serious twentieth-century critic – of liberalism¹. However, the fact that Schmitt criticized liberalism in many interrelated points² does not mean that he was an enemy of liberalism³. Even the most destructive criticism can be developed with the goal not to destroy but, rather, to save the criticized subject; to act not as an enemy but as a friend. Yet, due to the taint on Schmitt’s legacy⁴, many scholars still see his critique as strictly hostile to liberalism. This deprives Schmitt’s thought of its depth, turning him into a simpleminded ideologue of “nationalism” (Traverso, 2017: 370), “antisemitism” (Mehring, 2017: 309), and “totalitarianism” (Meierhenrich, Loughlin, 2021: 14). Even more of them are willing to see Schmitt’s theory as strictly historicist⁵, thus depriving him of the status of political philosopher. To view Schmitt seriously, therefore, is to try and restore not the negative, but the positive, part of his philosophy; to understand his conclusions on the “nature” of the state, the man, and the political.

The first step on this path is to obtain a clearer understanding of the connection between Schmitt’s positions and the positions of liberalism’s founder, Thomas Hobbes. Today there is almost no doubt that

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¹ That Schmitt proposes “a radical critique of liberalism” (Cristi, 1998: 169) is, with some rare exceptions (Newman, 2009; Larmore, 1996), equally recognized by Schmitt’s admirers as well as his opponents.

² The modern scholarship of this critique is extensive but can be divided into two general streams. Scholars like Bielefeldt (1997), McCormick (1999), and Bellamy (2000) try to analyze different subjects of the critique, while researchers like Young (2021) and Palaver (1995) try to assess Schmitt’s approach to it.

³ As Young (2021: 173) puts it: “It by no means follows, therefore, from [Schmitt’s] ‘critique of liberalism’ that he is not himself, in some sense, a liberal” (Cf. Strauss, 2016: §35). Cristi notes that Schmitt distinguished between two kinds of liberalism: “pure and consistent liberal individualism... and politically conservative liberalism, one that could simultaneously champion a strong state and a free economy” and that Schmitt himself was a proponent of the “authoritarian liberalism” (Cristi, 1998: 172, 174).

⁴ The most recent extensive account of the history of Schmitt’s collaboration can be found in Mehring’s work (2014). Schmitt’s approaches to self-defense can be separated into the initial (arrogance, lack of sufficient forethought, and tempting rewards (Bendersky, 1987)) and the latter (“an innocent hostage” (Sollors, 2020: 420)).

⁵ Many believe that Schmitt’s endeavors, in fact, were meant to save the Weimar Republic (Schwab, 2007: 13; McCormick, 1994: 624; 1999: 252 and 2016: 270; Sorell, 2003: 223; Bendersky, 1983: 85ff.; 1996: 126; Teschke, 2011: 73; Galli, 2023: 287–289).

Schmitt was a follower of Hobbes⁶. However, there is no consensus on what exactly the connection between them is⁷. Moreover, in the work in which Schmitt most openly sympathizes with Hobbes, *The Leviathan*⁸, the connection between them is the most difficult to trace⁹. Therefore, it would be better to start establishing this connection not through it but through *The Concept of the Political*¹⁰. There are two main reasons for this decision. First, there is almost universal agreement about the connection between Schmitt's concept of "the political" and Hobbes' notion of the "state of nature", which arose almost immediately after the work's publication¹¹. Second, whatever the connection is, the political is the starting point for understanding Schmitt's concept of the state, its relation to the nonpolitical, and its functions, on the one hand, and the fundamental position of man, on the other.

The first thing one learns about the political is that it precedes the state (CP: 19). This statement becomes understandable if, by "the political", Schmitt actually means the Hobbesian state of nature that precedes the state. This interpretation is supported by Strauss, who says: "In Schmitt's terminology... the *status naturalis* is the genuinely political status" (Strauss, 2006: §11). This also makes clear the statement that the political is directly related to the state (CP: 19–23). For Schmitt speaks only of collectives, and the only historically known form of a collective in the state of nature is the state (CP: 19, 30, 51; Hobbes, 1996: XXI; 2003: X, 17, XIII, 7; Cf. LST: 47, CP: 43–44). Moreover, it clarifies another of Schmitt's theses about the political – namely, that the political has its own "specifically political categories" irreducible to other categories that define what can roughly be called "spheres of social life". These categories are friend and enemy (CP: 25–26). At the same time, Schmitt concentrates strictly on the enemy, avoiding talking about the friend¹². Such a division and treatment of it is difficult to explain unless one understands the political to be precisely the state of nature.

According to Schmitt, the political is the most fundamental human condition, for it cannot be reduced to the various spheres of social life and their categories but is opposed to all of them (CP: 22, 25–26). Schmitt mentions among such spheres the religious (distinction between sinfulness/righteousness), juristic (distinction between legal/illegal), cultural (distinction between civilization/barbarism), economic (distinction between profitability/unprofitability), moral (distinction between good/evil), etc. Although, according to Schmitt, relations within these spheres can reach the political, upon reaching it, they cease to belong to their original spheres (CP: 26–27, 35–36). This mysterious description becomes clear if one remembers Hobbes' theory. In the state of nature, there is no positive law (whether the law of God or the law of man); until this law is declared or issued to men, the individual cannot follow it (Hobbes, 1996: XII–XIII) and therefore cannot be declared sinful or righteous, legal or illegal (Hobbes, 1996: XIV, XXVII). In the state of nature there is no culture or civilization, just as there are no nationalities; because the state of nature has no large or sustainable groups but only isolated individuals (Hobbes, 1996: XIII) who fear, first of all, other individuals, it is impossible to imagine that men would be able to create connections strong enough and lasting enough to produce something higher or more lasting than momentary goods (Hobbes, 1996: XVII; 2003, Preface and I, 2). In the state of nature, there is no economy; each individual has the right to everything, including the life of another, and therefore no one can have property, for no one can take away the rights of others to what is now in his hands (Hobbes, 1996: XIII, XV; 2003: I, 11, VI, 15). In the state of nature, there is no morality;

⁶ Especially considering Schmitt's statements (2017: 55) that Hobbes was his "friend" and intellectual mentor as well as Strauss' testimony (Strauss, 2006). Though this claim is disputed (Holmes, 1993: 41; Fischer, 2010: 402; Adair-Totteff, 2020: 114; Harman, 2020: 263), the vast majority of scholars agree on this point. McCormick (1999: 252) gives a rather extensive account of the literature linking Hobbes and Schmitt.

⁷ Bendersky (1996: 125) speaks of the "intellectual affinity of Schmitt and Hobbes"; Balakrishnan (2000: 223) states that "Schmitt saw himself as Hobbes' kindred spirit"; Croce and Salvatore (2023: 5) propose that "Schmitt fed off a Hobbesian social ontology"; Sorell (2003: 223) believes that "Schmitt adapts what he takes to be Hobbesian ideas"; Bredekamp (1999: 254) thinks that Schmitt "sought to reactivate the Hobbesian view"; McCormick (1994: 621, 643) speaks of Schmitt's "neo-Hobbesian project" and "Schmitt's effort to refortify the Hobbesian state" (2016: 270).

⁸ I will abbreviate Schmitt's works in the following manner: CP – *The Concept of the Political* (Schmitt, 2007a), LST – *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Schmitt, 1996), AND – *The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations* (Schmitt, 2007b); CT – *Constitutional Theory* (Schmitt, 2008); LL – *Legality and Legitimacy* (Schmitt, 2004); GC – *The Guardian of the Constitution* (Schmitt, 2015); PT – *Political Theology* (Schmitt, 1985); and TP – *Theory of the Partisan* (Schmitt, 2007c).

⁹ Most often the connection is traced through the questions of faith and myth (Tralau, 2010; Vatter 2004; McCormick, 2016; 1994: 626; Young, 2021: 189; Bredekamp, 1999: 254; Fischer, 2010: 402–405; Balakrishnan, 2000: 215ff.).

¹⁰ Because Schmitt considers the 1963 (and 1932) version of *The Concept of the Political* to be final, I will analyze it and not the 1933 version of the work.

¹¹ Strauss, in his *Notes* (2006: §11), states: "Schmitt restores the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature to a place of honor." After him, it is considered normal, at least, to pay lip service to this connection (see McCormick, 1994: 621, 623).

¹² This was noticed by many commentators, starting with Strauss (Strauss, 2006: §9; McCormick, 1994: 640; Mehring, 2017: 305–306) and will be discussed in more detail later.

the desires or affects felt by individuals are morally neutral (Hobbes, 1996: XIII; 2003: Preface). To say that men are morally evil by nature because they seek to harm others would be the same as to say that predators are evil. All the spheres of social life become possible as soon as the political is fenced off by the membrane of peace – the border of the state. And vice versa, as soon as the relations within these spheres break through said membrane, they go back to the natural/political state, where they themselves can no longer exist, turning into strictly political relations (CP: 36; Cf. Ardit, 2008: 7) – that is, destroying the previous political unity and creating a new one.

This conclusion also makes transparent Schmitt's insistence that the enemy cannot have any other properties (sinfulness/righteousness, legality/illegality, civilization/barbarism, profitability/unprofitability, goodness/evilness) than the property of being the enemy, not because we cannot or do not want to give him such an assessment but because it is *de facto* not applicable to him as a collective-individual that resides in the state of nature (CP: 26). This also clarifies one of the key statements of his legal doctrine: "A statute cannot be the guardian of another statute" (GC: 110) or "no norm... protects or guards itself; nothing that normatively valid enforces itself" (LL: 54; PT: 28). For justice, law – the "norm" – belongs to peace: "Norms are valid only for normal situations" (LL: 69). Therefore, the political, which precedes and surrounds peace, is fundamental in comparison with it.¹³ According to Hobbes' theory, the sovereign, as the guarantor of peace, remains forever in the state of nature – he does not enter into an agreement to create the state, being its product (Hobbes 1996: XVIII; 2003: V, 9). To put it in Schmitt's terms: The sovereign as the bearer of the united will of the state – that is to say, "a specific entity of a people" (CP: 19) – literally resides outside the law; he is not bound by any obligations, for it is the case not that the sovereign exists because of the law but, rather, that the law exists because of the sovereign (PT: 7, 13, 15; Vinx, 2015: 98, 103). Being in the state of nature, he has the right to everything and, at the same time, creates obligations for those who have achieved the peaceful life (Hobbes, 1996: XXI; 2003: X, 17, XIII, 7). Precisely because the law is guaranteed by what is outside it, "legality is in direct opposition to legitimacy" (LL: 9), and the sovereign, strictly speaking, cannot be "legal", only legitimate (Young, 2021: 169).

In the state of nature, in which the collective-individual finds itself, everything revolves around survival, for the state of nature is the "*bellum omnium contra omnes*" (Hobbes, 2003: Preface)¹⁴. The goal of each individual is the same – to survive (Hobbes, 2003: I, 7, II, 18; PT: 12)¹⁵. For the state, it means maintaining unity, i.e., peace within itself, represented by the united will of the people¹⁶, concentrated in the sovereign (Hobbes, 1996: XVII; 2003: V, 6–9). However, because, in the state of nature, everyone has the right to everything (Hobbes, 2003: I, 10) and therefore everybody is a potential enemy to everybody else (i.e., each individual is potentially dangerous to another (Hobbes, 1996: XIII; 2003: Dedication and I, 4)), the survival of the state directly correlates to the ability to independently (by its own will) determine who poses a mortal threat to it and eliminate this threat (CP: 29–30; PT: 9)¹⁷. That is why Schmitt notes that a collective that cannot determine its enemies by itself does not exist, i.e., it is not political (CP: 28). Moreover, Schmitt and Hobbes both emphasize that although the political/natural state is the state of hostility, this does not mean that it always involves armed struggle. The war of all against all consists of the possibility of armed fighting – in the ever-present possibility to eliminate the other, i.e., determine one's friend and enemy (Hobbes, 1996: XIII; CP: 37).

¹³ When some say that Schmitt's theory "seeks to nullify the rules of normal time" (Bredekamp, 1999: 253), they disregard the fact that it is precisely the appearance of the normal situation that is the most obvious and crucial effect of the creation of the state.

¹⁴ When McCormick says, "Schmitt's implicit reading of Hobbes, therefore suggests that a return to the state of nature is an ever-present possibility for any society" (2016: 278), he demonstrates an utter misunderstanding of Hobbes' and Schmitt's theories. All the states, all the collectives-individuals, as long as they exist, remain in the state of nature; this is not an extreme "possibility", but an inescapable reality. Yet, one can see why it is so hard for a man to understand why the death of the state would mean his personal demise.

¹⁵ McCormick here, once again, does not follow Hobbes'/Schmitt's logic by saying, "Schmitt will not even supply an account of the mechanisms, moral or not, that bring such people together to begin with and that keep them together" (2016: 280), although the mechanism seems rather obvious.

¹⁶ Hobbes introduced the term "will" into political theory through the notion of freedom. For "freedom or liberty indicates the human characteristic of being able to perform actions which proceed from the will" (Van den Enden, 1979: 187).

¹⁷ Norris tries to counter this conclusion by saying that "different regimes will be threatened by different things and in different ways, and these threats will not be self-evident" (1998: 84). Clearly, he is forgetting that from Hobbes' position every individual is, by nature, equally capable of understanding his, as well as others', situation and judging reasonably whether the situation requires actions "necessary to the preservation of his life, and members", or not (Hobbes, 2003: I, 9). This state of equality is very important. From Schmitt's point of view, there are no nations in the political. The Germans, Russians, or Americans do not exist in it; they could exist only outside it. That is to say, the collectives-individuals are faceless, as any and all identity belongs exclusively to peace and, taken by themselves, all collectives-individuals desire the same and possess the same rights of obtaining the desirable.

This makes it clear why Schmitt says that the concept of the enemy has a “concrete and existential sense” (CP: 27) and also why the friend/enemy distinction presupposes “the extreme case”, i.e., war (CP: 30, 35, 38, 48). In addition, this explains why Schmitt denies the possibility of justifying the physical killing through any rational explanation (CP: 36, 48). None such explanation can be valid in the state of nature, where one finds nothing but the dangerous nature of man¹⁸. The political (as well as the natural state) presupposes that, unlike other animals, which are dangerous on occasion, men are dangerous not due to some contingency but by the necessity of the natural desire to survive (CP: 58; Hobbes, 1996: XIII; 2003: Dedication, Preface, I, 4, 7). The fact that one collective-individual – through the sovereign as the focal point of its united will (CP: 45–47; GC: 168; PT: 24) – understands another collective-individual as a mortal threat and thus makes a decision about the enemy, without justifying itself in any way, but acting in “the heat of passion” (namely, the fear for its existence) – is the only possible situation of the political.

The enemy has only one property – that of “existential negation” (CP: 33). He must therefore be erased from existence; he must cease to exist. Schmitt should be understood here with a particular delicacy because he is talking not about men but about collectives (CP: 71). The enemy ceases to exist when it ceases to be a collective organized through a unified single will and not when all the members of it stop breathing¹⁹. The same, dialectically, is true for the friend – friendship between collectives as “the utmost degree of intensity of a union” implies the non-existence of the friend, his “existential association”²⁰. In other words, if some collective-individual wants to leave the state of nature, it can do this by joining another collective-individual, thereby losing its single will and ceasing to make independent decisions about friend and enemy, thus ceasing to exist (CP: 49)²¹. This corresponds exactly to Hobbes’ theory: If a collective-individual no longer wants²² to be in the state of nature, it can join another collective-individual, i.e., cease to exist, dissolving oneself in another (Hobbes, 1996: XIX, XXI; 2003: Dedication, VII, 18, IX, 12–13).

The collective-individual can freely determine with its will not only external but also internal enemies. However, just as Schmitt says, if a collective has internal enemies, this collective has already been destroyed, for some part of it has already reached the natural state, i.e., became a political unity (CP: 45–47). However, it can also do something else; because an individual in the state of nature has one main goal and the right to do everything to achieve it, and the collective-individual is in the state of nature, it, in order to achieve the goal of inner peace, i.e., its survival, can take any action to prevent other collectives from forming inside it (Hobbes, 1996: XVIII; 2003: VI, 13, XII–XIII). In Hobbesian language, the sovereign has the right to order his subject not only to kill another or die himself but also (under certain conditions) to commit suicide (Hobbes, 1996: XXI; 2003: VI, 13). In the end, individual men cannot enter the political and cannot have “enemies” (CP: 70–71). That is, their liquidation – no matter how large or small their number (as long as they do not represent a collective with a single will) – does not mean the destruction or death of the collective-individual. Moreover, this ability to demand everything from its members comes not only from the above-mentioned but also from the fact that the existence of all high things, from peace to culture, property, religion, and so forth, depends on the existence of the unified by a single will collective-individual. Being the basis for all sorts of high things, the collective-individual is more important in comparison with the human-individual: One can restore a culture or a faith if there is the state, but one who lost his state cannot have neither a culture nor a faith of his own.

The idea of the state as the collective-individual, that is, “having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed” (Hobbes, 2003: XII, 8), opens up the possibility of achieving the “qualitative total state” as opposed to the “quantitative” one (LL: 35). For if the goal of the state is to survive, that is, to maintain unity, then, taking into account the primordiality and autonomy of the political in contradistinction to the secondary character and dependence of all spheres of social life, one must admit that politics, as the activity of the state aimed at achieving its goal, permeates or should permeate all spheres of social life (GC:

¹⁸ Schmitt openly states that his vision of man as a problematic being is taken from Machiavelli and Hobbes (CP: 58–59; PT: 56; Cf. Young, 2021: 166; Harman, 2020: 261).

¹⁹ Schmitt deliberately places the category of the “absolute enemy” – the enemy that must be destroyed completely – to the last man (see TP: 93–95) “outside his criterion of the political” (Arditi, 2008: 10).

²⁰ McCormick is trying to separate the state of nature and the political by stating that “in the former, despite some occasional references by Hobbes to families or professions, there exist no friends and hence no antagonistic groupings” (2016: 286). What he does not realize is that in the political there are no groups of friends or enemies either, for the political, as with the state of nature, is filled exclusively with individuals – collective-individuals.

²¹ Sartori justly says that nations do not become friends by having a common enemy (1989: 65). One should always discern between an ally and a friend. That is to say, friendship between different collective-individuals historically looks like the Anschluss, and not like NATO or the EU. To put it in more simple language, friendship (like enmity) is a process, not a status.

²² I use the word “wants” because, as has been stated previously, the collective-individual has an individual will that resides in one particular entity – in the best case – in one person (Hobbes, 1996: XVII and XIX; 2003: X, 17; Cf. LL: 10).

131–132). Schmitt deliberately refuses to give even an approximate definition of politics, not because he “found it impossible to provide an exhaustive or even a general definition” of it (Schwab, 2007: 7). The reason for such a clearly noticeable move is the lack of any necessity to do it²³. Everything the state does is politics: “The state possesses the monopoly on politics” (CP: 22) and nothing that “political groups” within the state do is politics. Moreover, the very existence of these groups, as claiming to be political, marks the need for their dissolution (CP: 38). Nothing can exist within the collective-individual that would differ from it and, at the same time, would not threaten its essence as a unified whole. It is precisely this problem that confronts the collective-individual with the need to achieve “homogeneity”²⁴: to reject any possible group division within various spheres of social life. “Political life by necessity contains homogeneity which excludes *the other*” (Günsoy, 2016: 170–171; Cf. LL: 28). Thus, the state must permeate and control the economic, religious, moral, ethnic, etc. In Hobbesian language: The definition of good and evil belongs to the state, for if men are able to define good and evil (as well as other categories) by themselves, the state, as a unity, is destroyed (Hobbes, 1996: XVIII; 2003: VI, 11, XII, 1). The possibility of the total state becomes a necessity (GC: 132), dialectically transforming internal depoliticization (the absence of antagonism within various spheres of social life, which could reach the political (Böckenförde, 1997: 7)) into external politicization (the complete ability of the individual-collective to fight for its survival (GC: 172)).

Of course, equating human-individuals and states-individuals opens up a (theoretical) possibility of unifying the latter, similar to the unification of the former. Such a unification, however, would mean the cessation of the existence of the state of nature/political and, at the same time, the state as such: “A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist” (CP: 53). This is understandable, for the world state, humanity, taken as such, is not in the situation of fear for its own existence from the other; it is unproblematic, at least until non-humans are discovered (CP: 54). This means there could not be any politics in it: The “total depoliticalization” (CP: 54) that entails unified humanity means nothing but the death of the state (CP: 57). However, as Strauss shows (Strauss, 2006: §16–19), Schmitt, following Hobbes, rejects such a possibility: “The political can never be eliminated from human affairs” (McCormick, 2016: 271) as long as human nature remains problematic or “evil”. World peace is possible only if the man is, by nature, “good”. All teachings that proclaim the unproblematic character of man turn out to be apolitical – nothing more than a “critique of politics” (CP: 70).

Heirs of Hobbes – “by far the greatest and perhaps the sole truly systematic political thinker”²⁵ – in fact depoliticize liberal theory in two ways. On the one hand, some of them (K. Marx) abandoned the idea of the problematic nature of man. Others (J. Locke and B. Spinoza, who was closer to Hobbes in every sense²⁶), on the other hand, focused liberal theory on the individual man, thereby not abandoning the political but refusing to consider it – trying to hide the objective reality of the endless struggle of collectives behind a humanistic call for the protection of the rights and freedoms of men (CP: 70–71).

Schmitt’s theory, therefore, as an attempt to reinstate Hobbes, represents “liberalism with the opposite polarity” (Strauss, 2006: §32). Defending the primordiality of the state, which comes directly from the problematic character of human nature, Schmitt tries to return to the “inescapable political reality” (Bielefeldt, 1997: 67). At the same time, putting at the forefront the question of the survival of the collective-individual, he, as befits a liberal, can no longer raise the question of the good state²⁷. To put it somewhat better, Schmitt’s concept of the political turns out to be politically neutral rather than politically charged since it is wholly unable to answer the question: Who is the enemy?

²³ Cf. Schmitt’s claim: “The essence of the political does not concern the question whether politics can relieve all fighting or not (politics could not do so at all without ceasing to be politics), but the other question, what war and fighting derive their meaning from” (Schmitt, 1936: 549; cited by Meier (2006: 65–66)). Indeed, “for Schmitt the political lies ‘not in fighting itself’” (Meier, 2006: 32), for it is not war but survival that is the goal of the collective-individual.

²⁴ Schmitt calls it “substantial homogeneity” (CT: 116) or “social-psychological homogeneity” (CT: 207. Cf. AND: 88; Sorell, 2003: 227).

²⁵ Cited from the original version of *The Concept of the Political* of 1927 (Stanton, 2011: 160).

²⁶ When Schmitt attacks Spinoza in *The Leviathan*, he does so precisely because Spinoza (and not Locke) is the first heir of Hobbes’ theory. He is the closest to Hobbes historically and theoretically (Locke changes a lot to make Hobbes’ theory “more palatable” (Norris, 2000: 39)), and, yet, he completely switches the focus of Hobbes’ thought from the state-individual to the human-individual because of his explicit goal of protecting the individual freedom of thought (Spinoza, 1966: 200).

²⁷ “Schmitt’s new political perspectives were essentially amoral”, says Bendersky (1983: 87). However, it would be better to say that they were, in fact, immoral, as from Schmitt’s point of view, all moral positions are equally valid because they essentially belong to a particular will of a particular sovereign. They cannot exist outside of said will, in the political. However, some try to disagree with this conclusion. For example, Vatter (2004: 168–169), in his otherwise solid analysis of Schmitt’s thought, says that “only by leaving the state of culture... and returning to the state of nature will the individual be again confronted by absolute moral alternatives”, i.e. true or false faith. Thus, he completely ignores the fact that the sovereign cannot have any faith precisely because he resides in the state of nature. The same goes for Günsoy (2016: 169), who does not see “liberal universalism” in Schmitt’s conclusions.

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ЛИБЕРАЛИЗМ КАРЛА ШМИТТА

А. Н. Мишурин

Мишурин Александр Николаевич, научный сотрудник,
Институт философии РАН, Москва, Россия
E-mail: a.n.mishurin@iphras.ru (ORCID: 0000-0002-9942-772X. ResearcherID: N-2369-2016).

Аннотация

Предпринята попытка проследить четкую, пусть и предварительную, связь между мыслями Карла Шмитта и Томаса Гоббса через ключевую работу первого из них – «Понятие политического». Автор стремится доказать, что, несмотря на то что Шмитт является одним из самых глубоких критиков либерализма, он критикует его, оставаясь, как говорит Лео Штраус, «в горизонте либерализма». Иными словами, указывая на недостатки наследников Т. Гоббса, К. Шмитт одновременно пытается предложить продолжение политической теории Т. Гоббса, показать возможность альтернативного развития Гоббсовой мысли. Это развитие сосредотачивается не вокруг человека-индивида, но вокруг коллектива-индивида – «особого рода состояния народа», объединенного индивидуальной волей – государства, его свойств и прав. Чтобы раскрыть эту идею, автор в данной статье обобщает теоретический долг К. Шмитта перед Т. Гоббсом, показывая, что ключевые концепты его мысли, такие как политическое, человек, враг, государство, суверен и другие, были взяты именно у британского мыслителя. Таким образом, Шмитт оказывается в числе наследников Т. Гоббса, которых обычно причисляют к либералам.

Ключевые слова: Шмитт; Гоббс; государство; политическое; враг; человек; либерализм.