

ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ИСТОРИЯ

УДК 94(100)"1914-1919":574

doi 10.17072/2219-3111-2023-4-189-199

Ссылка для цитирования: *Nagornaia O. S.* A Fluid Enemy, Economic Resource and Bacteriological Hazard: Galician Rivers in Anthropological Constructs and Occupation Practices of the First World War // Вестник Пермского университета. История. 2023. № 4(63). С. 189–199.

**A FLUID ENEMY, ECONOMIC RESOURCE
AND BACTERIOLOGICAL HAZARD: GALICIAN RIVERS
IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS
AND OCCUPATION PRACTICES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR¹***O. S. Nagornaia*

Yaroslavl State Pedagogical University, Respublikanskaya str., 108/1, 150000, Yaroslavl, Russia

nagornaja.oxana@mail.ru

SPIN: 8025-0373

ResearcherID: R-3351-2016

Scopus Author ID: 35772771500

The occupation of Galicia played a special role for the Russian military and civilian administrations, for public organisations and combatants at the front as well as for the civilian population in the hinterland. The study draws on correspondence between military and civilian administrations on war strategies and tactics, plans and practices for the development of Galicia. Although actors did not attempt to explicitly capture the impact of the war on the occupied landscapes, this impact was overwhelming enough to shape many individual and institutional narratives both during the World War and in the interwar period. The horizons of expectation of combatants and the military administration were propaganda, which postulated the inseparability of Galicia and Russia, postulating the inseparability of Galicia and Russia, in part by arguing with the ecological motives: the similarity of landscapes and the integrity of river systems and wildlife. The formation of Galician mental spaces was facilitated by slavish-sounding toponyms, which were deliberately russified in many propaganda publications. After the initial contact with the Galician landscape these attitudes led many writing combatants to romanticisation of natural objects, which were described with the help of elevated metaphors. Due to its unpredictability during the war, however, Galician nature was gradually perceived as a dangerous enemy. The rivers were in the individual narratives as well as in the later works on military strategy often negatively anthropomorphised and even demonised.

Key words: First world war, environmental history, spatial turn, rivers environment, Galicia.

Introduction

The 1914–1918 manoeuvre warfare on the Eastern Front rapidly militarised vast territories from the Baltic to Black Sea. The totalised war erased the boundaries between the front and the rear with respect to nature exploitation, limitless mobilisation of resources and subjection of the environment to the military logic. The armed conflict altered the principles of space orders and transformed occupied territories into military landscapes which changed hands several times during the war. The alien nature, its mountains, forests and rivers became a defining factor in individual and collective military experience; objectified and anthropomorphised, perceived as actual combatants, they grew into an inseparable component of collective and national war narratives.

During the First World War, the river-rich Galicia attracted the attentions of all Eastern Front opponents which designed long-term plans for exploiting the natural and demographical resources of this region. Due to the gap between strategic planning and the propagandist euphoria associated with warfare and annexation of new territories on one hand and occupation practices on the other, rivers would transform into a mortal enemy, imaginary landmarks, transport arteries, romanticised nature and a bacteriological threat. They were studied through economic, geological and epidemiological

lenses, subjected to invasion and sterilization, evoked to discipline multinational armies. Descriptions of majestic, wild, dirty, dangerous Galician rivers are a recurrent motif in ego-documents and publications on military strategy authored by combatants of the Russian army during the First World War. Mass military experiences and memorial constructs were largely defined by contacts with the water network of militarised landscapes. The Galician military experience played an important role in preparations for a new war in the countries that emerged from the rubbles of collapsed empires. As I will attempt to demonstrate below, strategic and tactical reflections on the defeat in Galicia also became a central theme for Soviet military thought.

Despite the high visibility of Galician waterways in historical sources, their impact on the military experience of the combatants during the First World War was difficult to assess due to the absence of well-developed methodology for the study of conflict landscapes as well as to historians' unyielding interest in the ethnic aspects of occupation practices at the Austrian-Russian front. Studies published until recently viewed the occupation of Galicia by the Russian army during the First World War through the lens of ethnic and religious discourses and political campaigns. The themes that have gained prominence in research publications are the pro-Russian propaganda in the press, including Galician newspapers [Heid, 2016], as well as interventions supporting loyalty to the Russian Empire among the local population [von Hagen, 2007] and the conflict potential of the religious factor [Bakhturina, 2000]. Of considerable interest are publications addressing the economic history of Galicia (including the development of oil deposits [Frank, 2015]) where the First World War and the Russian occupation feature as one of the key subjects. Nevertheless, the confrontation with alien Galician landscapes, the experience of economic, resource and epidemiological [Astashov, 2021, s. 27–37] policies in the occupied territories as well as the role of symbolic representations of the Galician nature for the imagined and real occupation have yet to become an object of specialist study.

The interdisciplinary approach at the intersection of ecological and spatial conceptions has recently emerged as a promising methodology in military history research [Nagornaia, Golubinov, 2021, p. 5–16]. The claim that the environment became a casualty of the first industrial war to no less an extent than the combatants and peaceful population (or even more so) has become commonplace in recent publications primarily centring on events at the Western front [Keller, 2014]. A methodological symbiosis of archaeology and cultural geography has brought to the forefront of academic study the combat landscapes of the First World War – a special type of space subjected to the unnatural logic of the war. According to Chr. Nuebel, the spatial approach may enrich military history by focusing on three spatial dimensions: first, the connections between armies, warfare and geophysical space; second, the pre-war spatial orders and their transformations as a result of the hostilities; and third, the perception and interpretation of space during and after the war [Nuebel, 2014, s. 285–307]. N. Saunders defines military landscapes as “a hybrid of the original geographical location, geological nature, the cultural landscape at the time of the military event, that event itself, and the various ways in which it lives on in memory and is physically reconfigured so that real worlds and memory worlds are brought into alignment” [Saunders, 2021, p. 4–32]. We anticipate that by reconstructing the multiple dimensions of the conflict between people and the environment during the first industrial war we will be able to shed new light on the impact of that conflict on ecosystems, the appearance of landscapes, and the economic and resource management practices during the Era of Disasters.

The study draws evidence from correspondence between military authorities concerning war strategies and tactics as well as from communication between military and civil administrations discussing plans and practices for the development of areas in Galicia “occupied by the law of war”. The documents are held in the Russian State Military-Historical Archive and Kriegsarchiv in Vienna. Other sources of evidence included published essays, which flooded the Russian book market during a brief period in 1914–1915, as well as epidemiological reports on the state of water and soil and ego-documents of war participants (memoires, diaries and fiction).

A fluid enemy: Galician rivers in military strategy

Strategic publications issued during the WWI and the interwar period represented the Galician environment as a near-human being that could put up resistance, interfere with plans and render efforts

useless [Bonch-Bruyevich, 1919, p. 58]. Some natural spaces or their elements were seen as adversaries almost more dangerous than the real enemy, the Austrian and German armies. Water courses were perceived as an important part of war landscapes: not only large rivers, but also brooks and swamps were considered from the strategic, tactical and logistic perspectives. River beds demarcated lines of defence, separated military units and were used as the last (imaginary) boundary for possible retreat: "... the 3rd Army may not retreat further than the line demarcated by the Wisłok Dolny River meridian" [Kirey, 1926, p. 24]. The unmanageability of water bodies, aggravated by seasonal weather events, was described as an unsurmountable obstacle to combat tasks: inundations, current velocity, and overflowing swamps would destroy ferries and bridges and detain the advancement of the armies by several days [Beloy, 1924, p. 19; Bazarevsky, 1937, p. 99]. In many ways, the perception of rivers as a dangerous enemy was statistically justified: when counting the losses suffered by the 9th Army on 4–23 June 1916, A. S. Bazarevsky stresses that about 5 thousand out of 35 thousand servicemen perished during the crossing of the Prut and the related actions [Bazarevsky, 1937, p. 138]. The Galician military experience somewhat undermines S. Laakkonen's claim that warfare during the industrial era become less dependent on the natural conditions and disasters [Laakkonen, 2019, p. 15–37].

Many authors would associate particular hazards with the numerous left tributaries of the Dniester, which became a major hurdle to the advancement of the Russian forces inside Galicia [Diary..., 1914, p. 36; Tanfiliev, 1915, p. 7]. The swampy soils in the Dniester valley complicated the transfer of the artillery forces while remaining passable – if barely – for the infantry (RGVIA. F. 2067. Op. 1. D. 3902. L. 90–92 ob.). The overflowing of major Galician rivers such as the Vistula, the San or the Dniester occurred not only at springtime (the typical flooding season for Russian rivers), but also in summer when the rainfall in the Carpathian Mountains caused the water level to rise and increased current velocity. Later, in the Soviet period, Beloy mentions in his account of the battle of Galicia that the San River flood in early September 1914 was so unexpected and so strong that it destroyed the bridges used for the movement of the troops and military equipment [Beloy, 1929, p. 329]. A telegram sent by Mikhail Bonch-Bruyevich in December 1914 said: "The ice drift on the Vistula is becoming stronger by the hour, rendering it impossible either to keep the floating bridges closed or to build them fast" (RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 1. D. 733. L. 20).

Natural phenomena were seen as one of the factors defining the physical state of the armies. Analytical essays frequently mentioned that "the troops were exhausted by the rainy weather" (Ibid. L. 333) or that the armies "were suffering in the desperate struggle with the severe Carpathian nature at wintertime" [Bonch-Bruyevich, 1920, p. 50]. Individual perceptions of the local environment and the very change of landscape also played an important role for campaign planning and the army morale. According to Bonch-Bruyevich, the San acquired an enormous significance during the operations in Galicia: in the mental world of the Russian servicemen, it acted as a key landmark in the construction of combat spaces. For the soldiers, the river became a demarcation line separating military success from failure: "The fighting spirit rises after a period of rest, boosted by the awareness of the fact that since we are on the left side of the San, we must be advancing" [Sanborn, 2021, p. 113].

Attempts to tame and control the wild rivers on the enemy territory included exploration of water resources by designated military units. In summer 1915, a special unit of the 9th Army inspected and reported on 123 bodies of water across Galicia (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 318. L. 560 ob.). An attempt was also made to turn the waterways on the occupied territory into a weapon which would complicate fast movement for enemy troops, particularly the heavy artillery, in non-mountainous terrain. Water supply units undertook considerable efforts to inundate the territories in the Zbruch and Gniła area as well as around the Studenitsa and partly on the Dniester (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 318. L. 560 ob.). The flooding was preceded by geological surveys (including levelling and surface planning) "with multiple measurements and cross-sections" (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 318. L. 561). In total, 49 dams of different types were to be constructed; triple-belt wiring was installed below the water surface in shallow places. The total length of the flooded areas amounted to 41 km; the gross dam length exceeded 6 km, with some dams measuring up to 360 m in length and median maximum height reaching 6 m (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 318. L. 559–564). The construction resulted in seri-

ous alterations to the occupied landscapes and involved engineering surveys, road construction, forest clearing and supply of building materials.

The inundation plans for 1915 were expanded to include the southern tributaries of the river Pripyat traversing the areas of Russian Polesia adjacent to Galicia. The intense correspondence between military authorities, filled with mutual recriminations of embezzlement, indicates that inundation works were conducted annually to reduce the total length of the frontline and bring down the costs associated with the construction of conventional positions. Although the dams were not designed as permanent and the water levels could be brought down if necessary, the structures had a serious impact on the ecosystems. Dam construction required timber harvesting; piles were driven in and watersides reinforced. The submerged area amounted to 7200 km² in 1915–1916 and about 6000 km² in 1917 (RGVIA. F. 2080. Op. 1. D. 110. L. 1). The long-term consequences of hydro-engineering militarisation of landscapes in Galicia and Polesia require further study on the basis of new materials, including the documents issued by Austrian and German armies which ousted the Russian forces from these territories.

“The conditions for development in Galicia are brilliant” [Vergun, 1915, s. 59]: Imaginary and real occupation of river spaces

In the lead-up to the war, and especially after the first victories on the South-Western Front, numerous Russian popular science publications would describe Galicia as “part of historically Russian lands alienated from Russia”, one which must be “retained for ever” (RGVIA. F. 2067. Op. 1. D. 546. L. 32–38). Apart from the ethnic and religious characteristics of the population, it was natural factors, first and foremost river geography, that were evoked to prove that Galicia belongs to Russia – a factor, it was claimed, which had been overlooked during the annexation of the province by Austria-Hungary. The river San featured in Russian pamphlets as the imaginary boundary of an area with a high concentration of the ethnic-kin Ruthenians [The Conquest..., 1914, p. 69]. Journalists emphasised the absence of natural boundaries and barriers between Russia and its new province, the similarity of wildlife and vegetation, the unity of the Russian and Galician river networks: “The relief and the location of the rivers show that geographically Galicia forms an inseparable whole with Russia. Other natural features suggest the same” [Zubkowski, 1914, p. 8]. One of the authors provided geological arguments for this idea, using references to 19th century German publications [Tanfiliev, 1915, p. 3]. Surveys of Galicia’s riparian wealth reaffirmed the idea of Galicia as part of the Russian Empire and its economy as most navigable stretches of the waterways traversed the Russian territory, with only the floating segments located in Galicia. Efforts to include water bodies into a single empire-wide network and to construct additional canals between major Galician rivers were seen as highly promising [Krykov, 1915, p. 17].

The euphoria of the first military victories manifested itself through positive connotations, superlatives and expressive epithets present in the descriptions of nature: “the rapid and beautiful Cheremosh”, “the picturesque waterfalls” of the upstream Prut, “the lush flow meadows” and “the wonderfully rich pastures and hayfields” in the Dniester valley. Geographical names, arbitrarily interpreted, served as another important propaganda tool. For instance, cheap pamphlets mass-produced in 1914–1915 linked the name “Carpathians” with the Russian word *gorbaty* (“the hunch-backed ones”). A journalist enthused: “The names of Carpathian rivers and valleys are even more poetic. Think of the river separating the Russian villages at the foot of the Tatra Mountains from the Polish and Slovak towns. It bears the name Poprad (*misinterpreted by the author as meaning “Orthodox priests are pleased”*). – Oksana Nagornaia) and marks the boundary between Eastern and Western Slavs until today... The river bounded the area where the Slavs at the dawn of Christianity welcomed Orthodox priests; hence the peculiar name” [Vergun, 1915, p. 38]. It should be noted that hydronyms, apart from signifying territories and localities, were closely linked with the concepts of the border (boundary) and landscape: “Almost everyone associates the word “border (boundary)” with an expected transformation of life or landscape ... However, the border (or, should I say, the former border) between Russian and the part of the Austrian Empire known as Galicia defies these expectations... familiar landscapes are to be found everywhere” [Burczak, 1915, p. 5].

Pamphlet-writers would evaluate the potential of natural resources, including water bodies, from several perspectives. The numerous rivers starting in the Carpathian Mountains were described as

“a source of electric energy, which has recently come to be utilised for lighting purposes and in electrochemical industry” (RGVIA. F. 2005. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 120). Many authors referred to the potential of Galician mineral springs: “Most mineral wells in Galicia... are salty, with just a few sulphurous and very few acid springs; some springs, such as those in Szczawnica, Krynica and Iwonicz, offer health benefits” [Yastrebov, 1915, s. 14–15]. Galicia’s network of waterways was perceived as the key to future financial success: “... three large navigable rivers – the Dniester which links Galicia with the Black Sea, the Vistula and the San which connect Outer Subcarpathia with the Baltic Sea; both systems are linked with a river canal, which is nearing completion...” [Vergun, 1915, p. 59]. On the whole, technology transfer (involving the use of the territorial development plans designed before the occupation and the implementation of ongoing technological projects initiated by the ousted enemy) was a common practice for all countries that participated in the First World War. Thus, Germany’s water development works in the Baltic Region drew evidence from both German geological surveys and Russian irrigation plans drawn up for the Memel area in 1897–1900 (ZAMO, Akte 75. Denkschrift über die artilleristische Erkundung der Njeman-Stellung. Bl. 80).

Many pamphlets appear to share the Russian government’s enthusiasm for economic planning and for predicting the effects of Galician integration in the Russian economic system. A. Yu. Bakhturina mentions that discussions by the Council of Ministers in September 1914 addressed the management of Galicia’s natural wealth, particularly its abundant oil deposits, and stresses that this issue ranked higher on the agenda compared with the ethnic status of the territory [Bakhturina, 2000, p. 27].

The intense military activity and the briefness of the Russian army’s deployment in the area rendered it impossible to convert the imaginary occupation of Galicia into a sustainable reality. The adverse nature was seen as a major obstacle to this plan, along with funding shortages and tactical considerations. Plans were proposed to construct new railways and incorporate them into the Russian national network both for warfare purposes and for subsequent economic development of the region in peaceful times. The rivers played a decisive role in the calculations made by railway engineers as part of this project as the tracks had to cross the basins of the Vistula, Wieprz, San, Solokiya, Huczwa and Western Bug. The construction scheme caused protracted debates and consultations since the territory was “traversed by deep narrow gills, ravines and gorges as well as deep swamps reaching 7 sazhen (ca. 15 metres. – *Oksana Nagornaia*) in depth” (RGVIA. F. 2067. Op. 1. D. 546. L. 32–38). Rail construction across this challenging terrain would have required costly large-scale ground works which the authorities were cautious to initiate under military uncertainty.

The occupation period also witnessed some efforts to make Galician rivers (fully or partly) available to the Russian shipping system as transportation of goods, army forces, the wounded and POWs was launched on the Vistula from Warsaw via Ivangorod and Anipoli to Sandomir and back (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 159. L. 204). However, a large array of vessels, from steamboats and barges to light fishing boats, were sunk by the enemy and remained at the bottom of the river, part of them with the military cargo which could not be salvaged.

Immediately after the occupation of part of Eastern Galicia, the Russian commandment came up with proposals to use Galician resorts for the treatment and rehabilitation of the wounded and the sick. As early as in October 1914, a health resort was equipped in Lubień Wielki for the enlisted men recovering from cholera. However, rather than bringing health benefits for the patients, this scheme resulted in the pollution of the resort and its springs due to both the excessive burden on the available infrastructure and the organizational flaws: “... considerable damage was caused to all resort equipment, not to mention the natural environment, by the unsatisfactory lavatory facilities and insufficient surveillance over such a large team” (Annex No. 17 to the report of the Military Governor-General of Galicia. Report on the activities of the Military Sanitary Office of Galicia from 6 October 1914 to 1 July 1915, p. 59).

Importantly, the “colonially-minded” journalism, which hailed the benefits of the integration of Galician territories and water resources in Russian economy in 1914–1915, created a sustainable horizon of expectations for both the combatants and the civilians. Similar “geographical” arguments, although based on different ideological principles, were prevalent in Soviet pamphlets that questioned the legitimacy of Poland’s claim to Galician territories [Galicia under ..., 1927].

Epidemiological hazard: Galician rivers in medical discourses

In his seminal study on the role of nature in Russian history, Joachim Radkau justly claims: "... directly linked with environmental conditions, fear of disease is one of the strongest phobias in world history" [Radkau, 2014, s. 27]. The military threats under war and occupation were aggravated by epidemiological risks. The chaos that the hostilities and invasion brought Galicia provoked spontaneous militarization of civil spaces such as transport routes and nodes, where sanitary control was suboptimal. One such example was the railway station in Sokol which was converted into a major evacuation centre. In just several months, the centre grew into a large village "with no water supply or sewage amenities", which predictably became a source of intestinal infections (RGVIA. F. 2018. Op. 1. D. 941. L. 21). However, the Russian commandment linked these threats with exogenous nature- and population-related factors rather than with the living conditions of its own army.

A. B. Astashov insists that the epidemiological interventions by Russian occupation authorities in Galicia, apart from military necessity, were prompted by the awareness of the high standard of sanitary control achieved by the Austrian administration. In a bid to strengthen the loyalty of the local population, which was seen as ethnic-kin and therefore friendly, the Russian administration undertook large-scale melioration and disinfection of water sources. Regarded as indispensable to the future economic development and prosperity of Galicia (which was formerly dubbed "Austria-Hungary's step-child"), the works aimed to improve the economic well-being of Galicia as part of Russia [Astashov, 2021, p. 34–35].

Not all sources, however, confirm Astashov's description of the Austrian epidemiological system as exemplary. On the contrary, part of the documents quoted more advanced health care services provided by the Russian administration as convincing evidence of the former government's slackness. The main goal of military physicians was to ensure the safety of the military, who were forced to share an epidemiologically unsafe living environment with residents of the province. Russian servicemen and healthcare workers as well as loyal Galician officials, veterinaries and physicians jointly implemented epidemiological control measures in the occupied territories. Prominent epidemiology experts were specially invited from Russian universities to inspect the area, particularly the water sources – a move testifying to the importance of epidemiological and healthcare interventions. The pro-active approach taken by the occupation authorities in Przemyśl and their far-reaching plans to perform cleaning and construct the water supply system in urban regions surprised even the local residents. Although the Russian arrangements for troop housing, urban population supply and financial management became a target of severe criticism in later reports, the sanitary and epidemiological efforts were highly commended (Kriegsarchiv Wien. Bestand: Neue Feldakten; NFA; Kommando 1914–1918. Festung Przemysl unter Russenherrschaft. 1915).

The initial inquiry in several localities across Galicia identified a number of gross non-compliances at slaughterhouses: "there are no cemented pits for waste drainage; the drainage ways pollute the nearby brooks and rivers". Fearing epidemics and possible spread of infection through water sources, the occupational authorities introduced some water-protective measures, imposing a ban on "spreading manure or any other domestic waste subject to rotting; spillage of sewage and refuse; discharge of liquid industrial waste" (RGVIA. F. 2005. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 19). Waste was incinerated or transported outside of populated areas in order to control the spread of disease although no clear regulations regarding the disposal sites were adopted. On the whole, waste control and manure management aimed at preventing water contamination in Galicia became somewhat of a second front; the language of reports on waste removal represented a mix of genres, ranging from military communiques to metaphorical descriptions referring to Augean Stables: "Piles of manure, often taller than a human, were found in many households, particularly those where cavalry units were accommodated; the piles ran wall-like all along the stables, leaving only narrow passages to the doors" (Annex No. 17, p. 8).

Water bodies, rivers in particular, came to be seen as the main source of bacteriological hazard: "... meanwhile, given last year's outbreaks of cholera, typhoid and dysentery, which took the lives of several thousand servicemen and civilians, and the obvious connection between the epidemics and the

defects of the water supply systems in populated points and military camps, serious attention must be paid to improving water supply throughout the army deployment area” (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 318. L. 630–630 ob.). Reports by medical inspectors sounded alarming: “there is every reason to anticipate cholera outbreaks in the coming summer as cholera bacilli were found in rivers ... this autumn; cases of bacilli carriage and atypical (winter) forms of cholera have been recorded” (RGVIA. F. 2018. Op. 1. D. 941. L. 26 ob.). Cholera bacilli were also detected in the Dniester near Sambir (RGVIA. F. 2018. Op. 1. D. 941. L. 49). It should be noted that the intestinal diseases diagnosed in the area were classified as atypical by Russian scientists. A bacteriological survey of all water sources was undertaken after a cholera outbreak in the fortress of Przemyśl in April 1915 among the lower ranks of the 16th Reserve Reinforcement Battalion. A total of 30 water samples from wells and rivers were collected and tested, none of which were found to contain cholera bacteria (Annex No. 17, s. 13).

Reports by military physicians contain descriptions of experiments conducted to establish the benefits from the chlorination of water in natural sources and wells. The laboratory of the 9th Army disinfection units conducted a series of experiments whereby “the water was contaminated with typhoid and dysentery bacteria”, then treated with chlorine. The findings proved “unclear and unconvincing” and therefore were discarded as invalid, although chlorination of drinking water sources continued to be practiced (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 137. L. 44).

Regular checks and disinfections of water sources, including those located in towns and villages, were another important epidemiological safety factor for the army. Special military units cleaned countless water springs and constructed innumerable wells, sealed water drainages and replaced well curbs, reinforced access ways and equipped separate water sources for the cattle and people, tested potable water and treated it with chlorine (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 137. L. 7). One of the major sources of pollution, especially for river banks, was the ill-equipped army lavatories which contaminated ravines, forests and brooks crossing Galician gardens, villages and towns (RGVIA. F. 2139. Op. 3. D. 137. L. 9).

In winter 1915, the military administration jointly with local healthcare workers and administrators initiated a comprehensive survey of the territory to evaluate the safety of military burials: “Many locations where the most bloody battles had been fought (including Jarosław, Przemyśl, Stary Sambir and Felsztyn) contained numerous military burials and were strewn with poorly buried animal bodies, often lying near water sources and therefore threatening to poison the air with foul smell and to contaminate soil and water” (Annex No. 17, p. 41). The records referred to countless mass and individual graves scattered across the territory, especially along the San River. Most of the burials failed to comply with the safety standards imposed by either the Austrian or Russian authorities; the non-conformities, however, could not be rectified immediately as they were discovered at wintertime. The inspectors feared that “... the bank of the River San having been the site of particularly violent battles, new bodies are likely to be found in spring after the snow has melted” (GARF. F. 110. Op. 4. D. 3688. L. 19). The rivers acted as the principal source of epidemiological threats: “Meanwhile, given the circumstances, fast body removal in compliance with the sanitary requirements proved impossible; in many cases, the bodies were left unnoticed due to, in part, the large number of natural and artificial trenches, gutters, ditches, etc. The San River may also hide multiple bodies, if not masses of them” (GARF. F. 110. Op. 4. D. 3688. L. 81).

Along with battlefield sanitation, organization of burials and mechanical cleaning of populated areas and staging lines, water supply was among the primary epidemiological intervention areas in Galicia (Annex No. 17, p. 45). Reports claim that following an inspection of all graves in the area of Jarosław in March and April 1915, 77 mass burials were relocated; another 247 were brought into compliance with the effective sanitary regulations. Disinfection and horse body removal were also conducted. In the same period, mechanical cleaning of the waste and manure that had accumulated during the siege was carried out in Przemyśl town and fortress; in addition, “463 horse carcasses were removed... 750 bodies of the fallen servicemen were buried in the area of the forts... up to 25 mass burials containing the bodies of 500 servicemen were relocated in Staryi Sambir Uezd during Stage 2 of the works...” (Annex No. 17, p. 51). The decontamination and demilitarisation of combat landscapes (including the collection of weapons, the burial or transfer of human bodies and dead horses,

and the clean-up of waste) serve as examples of work with former military spaces at the sites of the battles on the Eastern Front.

Conclusion

The warfare on the South-Western Front of the First World War and the occupation of Galicia played a special role for Russian military and civil administration, public organizations and combatants at the front as well as the civil population in the rear. Russia's military experience on the South-Western Front was defined by the duration of the occupation (from September 1914 to June 1915), by the eventual re-capture of eastern Galicia by the enemy in 1916, and, first and foremost, by the imagined status of the territory as a historical part of Russia. The contrast between the initial successes and the subsequent defeat, the importance of the landscape and natural resources for the mobile warfare, the role of the long-term contacts with the alien environment explain the prominence of natural factors in the historical reflection that took place during and after the war.

For the combatants and military administration, the horizons of expectations were shaped by propaganda which postulated the indivisibility of Galicia and Russia, partly by playing the ecological card and emphasizing the similarity of landscapes and the integrity of the river systems and wildlife. The formation of Galician mental spaces was facilitated by similar-looking toponyms, which were deliberately russified in many propaganda publications. Following the initial contact with the Galician landscape, these beliefs and attitudes led many Russian writers to romanticise natural objects, which were described through elevated metaphors. However, owing to its unpredictability in war settings, Galician nature gradually came to be demonised and perceived as a dangerous enemy. The rivers were commonly anthropomorphised in both individual narratives and later works on military strategy.

The work on the conquered landscapes during the First World War was entangled in a dilemma between the imagined duration of the occupation, which required consistent integration of the territory with the Russian Empire, and the necessity to respond to urgent issues. Consequently, in-depth exploration of resource potential and the development of long-term plans regarding the Galician environment occurred in parallel to the negative impact on the landscapes such as deforestation, flooding and the burning of oil wells. Much of the discussions and practices of the occupation period revolved around epidemiological threats, which military and civil authorities attributed to the adverse environment and the local population. The exploration and sanitisation of spaces, primarily water sources were performed by military and civil physicians, scientists specially invited from Russia and the loyal residents. The physical and symbolic sterilisation of the conflict spaces and occupied territories appears to act as a model for their appropriation and integration with the imperial structures outside of the German legacy.

Acknowledgments

¹ The reported study was funded by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), project № 21-59-14003 “Great War and the Anthropocene: “Imperial Debris” and Environmental Change in Central-Eastern Europe”.

References

- Astashov, A.B. (2021), “Mobilisation and sanitation in rear of Russian army in 1914–1918: social and ecological analysis”, *Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta. Seria Istoriya*, vol. 2(53), pp. 27–37.
- Bakhturina, A.Yu. (2000), *Politika Rossiyskoy Imperii v Vostochnoy Galitsii v gody Pervoy mirovoy voyny* [The Russian Empire's Policy in Eastern Galicia during World War I], AIRO-XX, Moscow, Russia, 264 p.
- Bazarevsky, A. (1937), *Nastupatel'naya operatsiya 9-y russkoy armii. Iyun' 1916 goda* [Offensive operation of the 9th Russian Army. June 1916], Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1937, 158 p.
- Beloy, A. (1929), *Galitsiyskaya bitva* [Battle of Galicia], Gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvo, Moscow; Leningrad, USSR, 370 p.
- Bonch-Bruyevich, M. (1920), *Poterya nami Galitsii* [Our loss of Galicia in 1915], Gosudarstvennaya tipografiya, Moscow, Russia, Vol. 2, 268 p.
- Burczak, L. (1914), *Galitsiya. Ee proshloe i nastoyashchee* [Galicia. Its past and present], Chitatel, Moscow, Russia, 38 p.
- Dnevnik voyny Rossii s Germaniyei, Avstro-Vengriyei i Turtsiyei: sbornik vysochayshih manifestov, vozzvaniy i telegramm Verhovnogo glavnokomanduyushhego, pravitel'stvennyh soobshheniy, ofitsial'nyh*

- telegramm o hode voennyh deystviy* (1914) [Diary of Russia's War with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey: a collection of the highest manifestos, proclamations and telegrams of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, governmental messages, official telegrams on the course of military operations], Ekateringofskoe pechatnoe delo, Petrograd, Russia, 89 p.
- Frank, A.F. (2015), *Oil Empire. Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia*, Harvard University Press, Harvard, USA, 343 p.
- Galitsiya pod pyatoy Polshi* [Galicia under Poland's heel] (1927), Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, Moscow, USSR, 14 p.
- Haid, E. (2006), *Im Blickfeld zweier Imperien. Galizien in der österreichischen und russischen Presseberichterstattung während des Ersten Weltkriegs (1914–1917)*, PhD thesis, available at: <https://theses.univie.ac.at/detail/40074#> (accessed 14.01.2022).
- Keller, T. (2014), “Destruction of the Ecosystem”, in *1914–1918 online. International Encyclopaedia of the First World War*, available at: https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/destruction_of_the_ecosystem (accessed 20.02.2020).
- Kirey, V.F. (1926), *Artilleriya ataki i oborony* [Artillery of attack and defence. Conclusions from the use of artillery at the Russian Front in 1914–1917], Gosudatstvennoe izdatelstvo, Moscow, USSR, 149 p.
- Kriegsarchiv Wien. Bestand: Neue Feldakten; NFA; Kommando 1914–1918. Festung Przemyśl unter Russenherrschaft* (1915).
- Kryukov, N.A. (1915), *Slavyanskije zemli* [Slavic Lands. Agriculture in the Slavic lands in connection with the general development of these countries], vol. 2, part 1, Galicia, tipographia Kirshbauma, Petrograd, Russia, 489 p.
- Laakkonen, S. (2017), “Polemosphere: The War, Society, and the Environment”, in Laakkonen, S., Tucker, R. P. & T. Vuorisalo (eds.), *The long shadows: a global environmental history of the Second World War*, Oregon University Press, Corvallis, USA, pp. 15–37.
- Nagornaia, O.S. & Y.A. Golubinov (2021), “Environmental history of World War I on the Eastern Front: historiographical landscape gaps and research perspectives”, *Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta. Seria Istoriya*, vol. 2(53), pp. 5–16.
- Nuebel, Chr. (2014), “Raum in der Militaergeschichte und Gewaltgeschichte. Probleme, Ergebnisse und neue Felder der Forschung”, *Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, vol. 73, № 3, pp. 285–307.
- Parsky, D. (1919), “Combat of the 2nd Brigade, 46th Infantry Division with Austrians at Wielen, Mikhalev (Bodachevo), 13/26 August 1914”, in *Voенно-istoricheskij sbornik. Trudy komissii po ispol'zovaniju opyta vojny 1914-1918 gg.* [Military Historical Collection. Proceedings of the Commission on the Experience of the War of 1914-1918], vol. 1, Tipografiya Sytina, Moscow, Russia, pp. 51–69.
- Pevnev, A.L. (1924), *Konnitsa: Po opytu mirovoy i grazdanskoy voyn* [Cavalry in World War and Civil War Experience], Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 38 p.
- Radkau, J. (2014), *Priroda i vlast'. Vsemirnaya istoriya okruzhayushchey sredy* [Nature and power: a global history of the environment], Izd. dom Vyssh. shk. ekonomiki, Moscow, Russia, 472 p.
- Sanborn, D. (2021), *Velikaya vojna i dekolonizatsiya Rossiyskoy imperii* [The Great War and the Decolonisation of the Russian Empire], Bibliorossica, St. Petersburg, Russia, 453 p.
- Saunders, N.J. (2021), “The dead and their spaces. Origin and meanings in modern conflict landscapes”, in Saunders, N.J. & P. Cornish (eds.), *Conflict landscapes. Materiality and Meaning in Contested Places*, Routledge, London, UK, pp. 3–32.
- Tanfiliev, G.I. (1915), *Galitsia i Bukovina: geographicheskij ocherk* [Galicia and Bukovina: Geographical sketch], Tipografiya Sapognikova, Odessa, Russia, 52 p.
- Vergun, D.N. (1915), *Chto takoe Galitsiya?* [What is Galicia?], Lukomor'e, Petrograd, Russia, 65 p.
- von Hagen, M. (2007), *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, USA, 128 p.
- Yastrebov, N.V. (1915), *Galitsiya nakanune voyny* [Galicia on the eve of the Great War of 1914], Tipografiya Kollins, Petrograd, Russia, 55 p.
- Zavoevanie russkimi vostochnoy Galitsii* (1914) [The Conquest of Eastern Galicia by the Russians], Sytin, Moscow, Russia, 72 p.
- Zubkowski, V. (1914), *Galitsiya. Kratkiy obzor geografii, etnografii, istorii i ekonomicheskoy zhizni strany* [Galicia. A brief overview of the geography, ethnography, history and economic life of the country], Tipografia “Mirnyy trud”, Kharkov, Russia, 48 p.

Дата поступления рукописи в редакцию 24.01.2023

ТЕКУЧИЙ ВРАГ, ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ РЕСУРС И БАКТЕРИОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ УГРОЗА: РЕКИ ГАЛИЦИИ В АНТРОПОЛОГИЧЕСКИХ КОНСТРУКТАХ И ОККУПАЦИОННЫХ ПРАКТИКАХ ПЕРВОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЫ¹

O. S. Нагорная

Ярославский государственный педагогический университет имени К. Д. Ушинского, 150000, Россия, Ярославль, ул. Республиканская, 108/1

nagornaja.oxana@mail.ru

SPIN-код: 8025-0373

ResearcherID: R-3351-2016

Scopus Author ID: 35772771500

Маневренная война 1914–1918 гг. на Восточном фронте стремительно милитаризовала огромные территории от Балтийского до Черного морей. Тотализация военных действий способствовала стиранию границ между фронтом и тылом в отношении практик эксплуатации природы, безоглядной мобилизации ресурсов и подчинения окружающей среды военной логике. Вооруженное противостояние изменило принципы организации пространства, при этом в особые военные ландшафты превратились оккупированные территории, принадлежность которых в ходе войны менялась несколько раз. Здесь чуждая природа – горы, леса, реки – стали определяющим фактором индивидуального и коллективного военного опыта. Посредством приемов объективации и антропоморфизации они были возведены в ранг реальных комбатантов, превратились в неотъемлемую составляющую групповых и национальных нарративов о войне. Богатые реками области Галиции играли в Первую мировую войну специфическую роль для всех стран-противниц на Восточном фронте, разработавших долгосрочные планы использования природных и демографических ресурсов этой территории. В возникшем разрыве между стратегическим планированием, пропагандистской эйфорией интеграции новых территорий, боевыми действиями и оккупационными практиками реки превратились в смертельного врага, воображаемые ориентиры, транспортные артерии, романтизированную натуру и бактериологическую угрозу. Они изучались сквозь призму экономики, геологии и эпидемиологии, подлежали покорению и стерилизации, их образ использовался для дисциплинирования многонациональных армий. Описание величавых, бурных, грязных, опасных галицийских рек красной нитью проходит в эго-документах и военно-стратегических трудах комбатантов русской армии Первой мировой войны. Массовые военные переживания и мемориальные конструкты в значительной степени были определены контактами с водной сетью милитаризованных ландшафтов. С недавних пор пространственное и экологическое измерение первой индустриальной войны попало в центр научных дискуссий. Неведомое по своему масштабу противостояние человека и окружающей среды признается в новейших исследованиях Западного фронта столь же значимым для военного опыта комбатантов и гражданских лиц, как и сами сражения. Междисциплинарное исследовательское сообщество военных историков, антропологов, археологов и культурных географов едино во мнении, что ключевая роль «судьбоносного слияния» человека и природы в эпоху Великой войны парадоксальным образом не соответствует степени изучения этого феномена в современной науке. Представленная статья нацелена на компенсацию существующих лакун по исследованию Восточного фронта Первой мировой войны сквозь призму экологической и пространственной истории. На примере отражения столкновения русских армий с водными ресурсами оккупированной Галиции автор исследует модели воображаемого и реального покорения окружающей среды в ходе военных действий, стратегии и практики милитаризации ландшафтов, роль антропоморфизации природы в индивидуальных и групповых нарративах о войне. Восприятие чужеродных пространств и водных ресурсов как эпидемиологической угрозы привело не только к мерам реальной дезинфекции, но и воображаемой стерилизации пространств от немецкого наследия.

Ключевые слова: Первая мировая война, экологическая история, пространственный поворот, экология рек, Галиция.

Примечания

¹ Исследование выполнено при поддержке Российского фонда фундаментальных исследований (РФФИ), проект № 21-59-14003 «Великая война и антропоцен. "Токсичное наследие империй" и экологические изменения в Центрально-Восточной Европе».

Библиографический список

- Асташов А.Б.* Мобилизация и санитария в тылу русской армии в 1914–1918 годах: социально-экологический анализ // Вестник Пермского университета. История. 2021. № 2(53). С. 27–37.
- Базаревский А.* Наступательная операция 9-й русской армии. Июнь 1916 года. М.: Воениздат, 1937. 158 с.
- Бахурина А.Ю.* Политика Российской империи в Восточной Галиции в годы Первой мировой войны. М.: АИРО-XX, 2000. 264 с.
- Белой А.* Галицийская битва. М.; Л.: Гос. изд-во, 1929. 370 с.
- Бонч-Бруевич М.* Потеря нами Галиции. М.: Гос. типография, 1920. Т. 2. 268 с.
- Бурчак Л.* Галиция. Ее прошлое и настоящее. М.: Читатель, 1914. 38 с.
- Вергун Д.Н.* Что такое Галиция? Пг.: Лукоморье, 1915. 65 с.
- Галиция под пятой Польши. М.: Гос. изд-во, 1927. 14 с.
- Дневник войны России с Германией, Австро-Венгрией и Турцией: сб. высочайших манифестов, воззваний и телеграмм Верховного главнокомандующего, правительственных сообщений, официальных телеграмм о ходе военных действий. Пг.: Екатеринбургское печатное дело, 1914. 89 с.
- Завоевание русскими Восточной Галиции. М.: Сытин, 1914. 72 с.
- Зубковский В.* Галиция. Краткий обзор географии, этнографии, истории и экономической жизни страны. Харьков: Мирный труд, 1914. 48 с.
- Кирей В.Ф.* Артиллерия атаки и обороны. М.: Гос. изд-во, 1926. 149 с.
- Крюков Н.А.* Славянские земли. Т. 1, ч. 1. Галиция. Пг.: Тип. Киришбаума, 1915. 489 с.
- Парский Д.* Бой 2-й бригады 46-й пехотной дивизии с австрийцами у Велене, Михалева (Бодачева) 13/26 августа 1914 г. // Военно-исторический сборник. Труды комиссии по использованию опыта войны 1914–1918 гг. М.: Тип. Сытина, 1919. Вып. 1-4. С. 51–69.
- Певнев А.Л.* Конница: По опыту мировой и гражданской войн. М.: Воениздат, 1924. 38 с.
- Радкау Й.* Природа и власть. Всемирная история окружающей среды. М.: Изд. дом Высш. шк. экономики, 2014. 472 с.
- Санборн Дж.* Великая война и деколонизация Российской империи. СПб.: Библиороссика, 2021. 453 с.
- Танфильев Г.И.* Галиция и Буковина: географический очерк. Одесса: Тип. Сапожникова, 1915. 52 с.
- Ястребов Н.В.* Галиция накануне войны 1914. Пг.: Тип. А.Э. Коллинс, 1915. 55 с.
- Frank A.F.* Oil Empire. Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2015. 343 p.
- Haid E.* Im Blickfeld zweier Imperien. Galizien in der österreichischen und russischen Presseberichterstattung während des Ersten Weltkriegs (1914–1917): PhD thesis. 2006. Available at: <https://theses.univie.ac.at/detail/40074#> (accessed: 14.01.2022).
- Keller T.* “Destruction of the Ecosystem”, in 1914–1918 online. International Encyclopaedia of the First World War. 2014. Available at: https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/destruction_of_the_ecosystem (accessed: 20.02.2020).
- Kriegsarchiv Wien. Bestand: Neue Feldakten; NFA; Kommando 1914–1918. Festung Przemyśl unter Russenherrschaft. 1915.
- Laakkonen S.* Polemosphere: The War, Society, and the Environment // The Long Shadows: a Global Environmental History of the Second World War / S. Laakkonen, R.P. Tucker & T. Vuorisalo (eds.). OREGON ST UNIV PR, Corvallis, 2017. P. 15–37.
- Nagornaia O.S., Golubinov Y.A.* Environmental History of World War I on the Eastern Front: Historiographical Landscape Gaps and Research Perspectives // Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta. Istoriya. 2021. Vol. 2(53). P. 5–16.
- Nuebel Ch.* Raum in der Militaergeschichte und Gewaltgeschichte. Probleme, Ergebnisse und neue Felder der Forschung // Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift. 2014. Vol. 73, no. 3. P. 285–307.
- Saunders N.J.* The Dead and Their Spaces. Origin and Meanings in Modern Conflict Landscapes // Conflict landscapes. Materiality and Meaning in Contested Places / N.J. Saunders, P. Cornish (eds.). Routledge; London, 2021. P. 3–32.
- Hagen M. von.* War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918. University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2007. 128 p.