ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ РЕЖИМЫ

УДК-323
DOI: 10.17072/2218–1067–2018–4–106–121

EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AUTOCRACIES

Evgeniya Mitrokhina
National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract
Authoritarian regimes differ in the degree to which the leader is constrained in his ability to influence the decision-making process. It has been argued that an unlimited executive can either lead to adverse economic policy outcomes or improve economic performance. The paper reassesses the impact of executive constraints on economic performance. While most of the previous studies in this area focus on regime typologies, this research uses observable indicators of power personalization in 90 autocratic countries from 1960 to 2010 to estimate their impact on economic performance. The author considers power concentration, the range of powers available to chief executives and their ability to dismiss ministers as the indicators for measuring the leaders' potential for influencing the decision-making process. It is concluded that the countries where the leaders can stay longer in office, have a possibility to change the cabinet unrestrictedly, and concentrate more power in their hands tend to be more opportunistic. The results imply that strong leaders establish such a power-sharing regime that allows them to act in a self-interest way.
Keywords: executive constraints; power personalization; political regimes; economic growth; autocracies.

Introduction

Economic performance varies a lot in autocracies, there are examples of very rapidly growing economies and stagnating or even declining ones[13]. Existing literature shows that one of the reasons for these diverse outcomes lies in the political organisation that is reflected in political regime type (see Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008). Regime typologies are the main tool to estimate the relations implying different sets of rules which allocate power and how the power is exercised (Geddes et al., 2014). However, their usage has been criticised (see Wilson, 2014) because they do not allow a scholar to distinguish institutional influence from that of the leader. At the same time, personalism denoting the degree of leaders' personal power and his ability to influence decision-making process without constraints is important for policy outcomes. Despite the implied significant role of leaders in decision-making, the literature has not addressed

[1] Data shows that distribution of real GDP per capita growth rates differ significantly within autocratic regimes, there are more successful and more very badly performing autocracies (e.g. Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007; Weede, 1996).

the question of how the degree of power that a dictator possess affects economic performance.

Since in many cases institutions in autocracies are influenced by the leader, his ability to influence decision-making process affects policy outcomes. Relying on Svolik's (2009) idea about different types of power-sharing regimes in autocracies, I distinguish strong and weak leaders. The author argues that a higher level of power personalisation has negative effect on economic performance. Theoretical works demonstrate that institutions may exist in a regime but if the leader is strong enough they do not restrict him. Despite the importance of a leader in economic performance, empirical papers concentrate on the existence of institutional constraints for the leader (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008).

As it is difficult to distinguish between the influence of institutions and the leader in determining policies that affects the economy. I estimate models accounting for institutional factors as well as leaders' characteristics. The variation between leaders in autocracies is high, that is why I use the most distinctive features of personalism. I consider power concentration as longevity of a leader staying in power, executive constraints as the decision-making power of the chief executive, and interactions with the elite as the ability to dismiss legislature or cabinet. The results show the negative effect of personalism on economic growth. Comparison between Chili (1973–1987) and Brazil (1972–1984) indicates the growth two times higher for Brazil. Both countries in the specified period of time are classified by Magaloni et al. (2013) as military regimes, the difference is that in Chili power was in hands of Pinochet, while in Brazil three leaders changed consequently and their power in the decision-making process was limited. Hence, the influence of institutions and the leader is important considering decision-making in autocracies.

Even existing institutions in autocracies do not necessarily limit the dictator because they may be established by him. The actual behaviour of the leader shows that generally, autocrats that have more power tend to affect economic outcomes in a worse way. To investigate the relations I use fixed effects model to account for unobserved country-specific characteristics and then account for the dynamic structure of GDP using GMM estimator. The effect of personalism is negative regardless of the estimator choice, but the GMM method gives more efficient estimates. I use "Autocracies of the world" database (Magaloni, Chu, Min, 2013) that gives an opportunity to account for observable indicators of personalism including them in the model along with the regime type that reflects institutional organisation as a framework for interactions between the leader and the elite.

In all of the models, the distinguished indicators of personalism show the negative impact on economic growth. There is a relation between duration of the dictator staying in office and lower economic performance of the country. That confirms the association between power concentration that develops with years that a leader can hold power and issues of power-sharing in autocracies (Svolik, 2009). Acquiring more power compared to the ruling coalition, the dictator is less threatened by a coup and can behave opportunistically. The reason is that the dictator is not threatened by the elite

and has an opportunity to implement policies that provide him with additional revenue and at the same time damage economic performance of the country. Real purges of elite also show the significant negative effect on economic performance. The constant shuffling of the cabinet or legislature allows the leader to stay stronger while the continuous change of members of the ruling coalition does not allow them to accumulate power. It is also connected with the idea that elites may pose the threat for the dictator to be removed out of power (Magaloni, 2008).

Economic growth in autocracies
Heterogeneity of autocracies

The awareness of institutional heterogeneity within the non-democratic regimes is very high, not all autocracies work in the same way (See Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Geddes, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2002). According to scholars the authoritarian governance and its institutional settings affect the duration of the regime (e.g. Geddes et al., 2014), transition and regime change (e.g. Escribà-Folch, 2013) as well as policy outcomes. Variation in institutions among autocracies matters a lot for economic performance. As policy outcomes are shaped by institutions, the reason for divergent economic performance in non-democratic regimes is in the institutional organisation that determines success or failure. In more institutionalised autocracies more resources are allocated to public goods (Gandhi, 2003), these countries are less likely to start wars compared to regimes where there are no institutional bounds (Geddes et al., 2014), and promote better economic growth (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008). In this context regime denotes distinction between different sets of rules, which allocate power (Geddes et al., 2014). At the same time, political regime reflects the way in which the power is exercised. That is why it is reasonable to assume that not only political institutions have consequences for policy outcomes but the power that political actors have to influence the policy.

Some dictatorships are purely autocratic, meaning that no constraints are established for the leader or a ruling group. On the contrary, there are dictatorships that obtained seemingly democratic institutions such as legislatures, elections, and political parties[24]. Data shows that distribution of real GDP per capita growth rates differ significantly within autocratic regimes, that there are more successful and more insufficient autocracies compared to democracies that are generally homogeneous in terms of economic performance (e.g. Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007; Weede, 1996). The examples of successful autocracies include China and the so-called "East Asian Tigers" (Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea). There are also examples of economic disaster in autocracies (African countries, for example, Zaire under Mobutu, Angola, Uruguay, Guyana, Mozambique).

In empirical works, the difference in economic performance between autocracies is explained by the type of political regime that serves as a proxy for regime institutionalisation. Gandhi (2008) provides evidence that more institutionalised autocracies

[2] According to Gandhi (2008) legislatures exist in 69.8 percent of autocracies; 78.6 have political parties (among them 53 percent are single- party states and 47percent allow epy existence of multiple political parties).

have better economic performance compared to those that lack legislatures or/and political parties. Wright (2008) introduces a notion of "binding institutions" for regimes where institutions that constrain the power of a dictator are necessary due to economic conditions (depend more on domestic investment, not natural resource revenue). The binding institutions, thus, suggest commitment and increase investment and growth.

The works show that even though institutions in autocracies are nominal their existence improves economic performance. However, the overly functionalist approach to institutions used in these works becomes more criticised. Literature shows that some regimes referred to as party-based, in reality, have weak political parties that lack the ability to influence rent distribution, elite management etc. (Brownlee, 2007; Meng, 2017). More scholars notice that mutually exclusive categories do not reflect the distinction between the leader and the regime (Wilson, 2014).

Regime typologies reflect the organisation of power, but do not reveal its distribution and, most important, how the power is exercised in decision-making process. Pepinsky (2014) notice that regime typologies also do not capture the changes in the distribution of political power over time within one country during an established political regime[35], even though the shift to a more personalised rule is associated with tenure of an autocrat (Svolik, 2012). Thus, using of regime typologies does not allow a scholar to differentiate between various dimensions of the autocratic rule such as leader's strength and political party's strength and their development and change over time.

Power personalisation and economic performance

It is more important to understand who has more influence on the decision-making process in autocracies, and applying regime typologies does not always truly reflect the reality. In the work I argue that it is important to consider the ability of a leader to influence the decision-making process reflected in economic performance. Policies and economic institutions are determined partly by the person who runs the government, the structure of the regime and political power relations (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). It is not clear how strong the dictator is and how much power he has (because even existing institutions cannot guarantee a good policy implementation if the dictator has no fear to be removed from power).

When it is possible, the leader consolidates personal power and does not need to create a coalition of supporters to stay in office. Following the logic that is established in existing studies that use typologies to investigate the connection between institutions and economic growth, it is possible to focus on regimes that are more personalised, meaning narrowly supported by the elites and others less personalised where the leaders' ability to shape policy outcomes is bounded by the support of the elites. The strength may change over time within one political regime in one country. Personalism may be present in each regime to some degree, that is why it is possible to consider personalism as a continuous measure (Hadenious and Teorell, 2007). Relying on Chehabi

[3] For example, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and The Communist Party of the Soviet Union are two common examples of highly institutionalized party-based regimes. At the same time under the first leaders, these parties were less powerful compared to the leaders' ability to influence decision-making and power consolidation.

and Linz (1998) understanding of the immense power of rulers, I understand personalism as dominating discretionary power of a ruler to influence the decision-making process.

In the work I mostly rely on Svolik's paper (2009), where he suggests two power-sharing regimes in autocracies: contested and established dictatorships. It is believed that leaders might be strong and weak; assuming that longer staying in power allows a dictator to accumulate more power and, thus, have more influence on the decision-making process and economic policy as a consequence. Boix and Svolik (2013) notice that in the context of power-sharing between ruling elite and a leader, in the case where a dictator is very powerful, institutions will not provide power-sharing with others even if they exist. They also notice that in some cases a dictator may have a lot of power and even prevent the appearance of institutions. At the same time, without institutional constraints leaders face greater uncertainty regarding their political future. Throughout the years a leader has been in power, his ability to manage authoritarian elites performs as a proxy for power personalisation. As leaders' power is conditional on the threat posed to him I evaluate the hypothesis that tenure of a dictator is associated with worse economic performance.

Hypothesis 1: a leader longer staying in power has negative effect on economic performance.

There exists an idea about stationary bandit (Olson, 1993), suggesting that, contrary to roving bandits, those who stay in power longer have incentives to invest in the economy instead of constantly extracting some rents. I assume that the main purpose of the leader is not maximising wealth but his own power. There are examples where leaders stayed long in power and at the same time implemented policies that were disastrous for their countries[46]. The balance of power evolves endogenously, if the dictator is able to stay in power longer without a coup, then he accumulates enough power that the elite is no threat to him anymore (established autocracy). Then the dictator can eliminate supporters because he doesn't need them for the regime survival. His choice of policy is unconstrained. Usually, control over the key executive posts is in hands of a leader to secure key appointments. Power to dismiss executives is also a sign of power personalisation. Only a strong leader can shuffle the elite not to allow them to become strong to threaten him.

Hypothesis 2: unconstrained ability of the leader to shuffle the elite negatively influence economic growth.

The long-time horizon does not necessarily stimulate the leader to promote economic growth but may lead to the institutional reshaping without changing the regime type itself. Leaders' strength may be accumulated over time and affect power-sharing in the regime. Following the understanding of strong and weak leaders it is possible to assume that strong leaders can shuffle elites and thus intensify the collective action problem in autocracies destroying possible coalitions against him (Acemoglu et al., 2004). There are historical examples when dictators' allies become their enemies[57]. A

[4] Mobutu were in power for 32 years, Trujillo for 31 years, Somozas for 42 years.

5 [7] One of the vivid examples is Trujillo leader of the Dominican Republic who shuffled government personnel, army and police generals

strong leader can diffuse opposition and adopt any policy that may be even costly to the society. Existing institutions (such as the legislature and political parties) are not created to bind the dictator, their main function is to punish or, in some cases, award the elites to prolong the regime (Wright, 2008).

Hypothesis 3: fewer constraints on the executive decision-making power negatively influence economic performance.

Without institutional constraints leaders face greater uncertainty regarding their political future. It is important to understand how strong the dictator is and how much power he has (because even existing institutions cannot guarantee a good policy implementation if the dictator has no fear to be removed from power). The uncertainty makes dictators more likely to steal from the state, as it will satisfy their short-term needs, even if the long-run term economic consequences of doing so are dire (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011). Formal institutions in autocracies have to be considered, but only they alone cannot provide information about how personalist a regime is. Thus, it is important to understand how the degree of power that a leader has is connected with his ability to influence policy.

Data and methods

The main sample represents an unbalanced annual panel of 132 countries from 1960 to 2012. To test the effect of observable indicators of personalism on economic growth I estimate the following model

$$y_{it} = \beta_1 P_{it} + \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_2 y_{it-j} + \beta_3 X_{it} + \beta_4 Z_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable is log of GDP per capita, in country i for year t, P_{it} is the set of main independent variables which are observable indicators of personalism, X_{it} denotes regime type according to Magaloni, Chu, and Min's (2013) regime types classification, Z_{it} is a set of control variables, α_i absorbs time-invariant country characteristics (country fixed effects that capture range of unobserved characteristics, such as institutional, cultural, historical and others) and δ_t denotes time fixed effects (capture global economic trends). The value of GDP in previous years ($\sum_{j=1}^{p} y_{it-j}$) is included on the right-hand side to account for dynamic effect, following Acemoglu et al. (2014) I include in models four lags of GDP. According to the literature, GDP is determined by a dynamic linear panel model autoregressive component and country as well as time fixed effects (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008).

The basic controls used in growth regressions are included in the models log of exports and imports, log of population, log of infant mortality, and log of the real value of natural resources produced per capita (petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals). Source of the data for all control variables is the World Development Indicators (WDI), for control variables missing values are linearly extrapolated.

I estimate these models by using standard within and moment-based estimators, standard errors are robust against heteroscedasticity in all specifications. These

methods account for the unobserved country-specific effect. The usage of the moment-based estimator gives an opportunity to account for countries heterogeneity that makes it possible to understand whether the effect is due to the countries differences or their predisposition (for example, lower levels of GDP a previous year is connected with lower values in current ones) (Wawro, 2002).

Observable indicators of personalism

To estimate power concentration I rely on Magaloni, Chu, and Min's (2013) measure of personalism. They construct it for each regime exploiting the number of years that a unique executive is in power in relation to the duration of the regime, taking into account a year that previous executives have been in power (Herfindahl index)[6]. "Autocracies of the world" provides the index only for autocracies, following their methodology I calculate the index for democracies as well. The advantage of the measure is its changes in time, as it shows that personalism is an evolving phenomenon and can be different within one regime. The logic applied here is that if a country-regime experiences leadership changes it is less personalistic compared to a regime in which one leader is in power for the whole regime time span. Thus, the approach measures the dimension of personalism and to a certain degree is applied to each country-regime.

As there is no data about actual elite purges in dictatorships I consider the potential ability of a ruler to do so. To estimate the leader-elite interaction I use data from Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). The data contains information about the ability of the decision-making power to dissolve the legislature, where 0 if it is impossible and 3 if a dictator can do it at own discretion and without restrictions[7]. Another indicator is whether a leader can dismiss ministers, the same coding is applied.

Polity IV xconst variable indicates the "extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives, whether individuals or collectives" (Polity IV, 2012). The variable captures check and balances on executive power. Fewer institutional constraints on executive suggest more personalist the regime. It contains seven categories, I use the transformation of the variable applied by Magaloni et al. (2013), where 2 denotes high personalism (1 in xconst), 1 – moderately personal (2–4 in xconst), and 0 – weakly or not personal (5–7 in xconst).

Leaders can change institutions at will, thus, legislatures and parties are just one of the components that impact economic growth, but still, they have to be considered in the analysis. For the regime classification I use "Autocracies of the World" data set (Magaloni et al., 2013). It contains information about political regimes from 1960 to 2012. Monarchy, military, multiparty, single-party regimes are represented in the classification, based on the estimation of "source of policy making, structure of elite interaction and competition, and the selection and composition of the political leadership" (Magaloni et al., 2013). They introduce multiparty regime type that reflects the

[6] The measure is calculated for each country-regime according to the formula $\sum_{i=1}^{m}(exec_i/n)^2$, where n is the age of the regime, exec is the number of years a particular person *i* has been in power (out of total *m* leaders).

[7] Middle categories are 1 if a dictator can dissolve the legislature only as a response to specific events and 2 if a dictator can dissolve the legislature at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions.

concept of "electoral autocracies" (Linz 2000) and similar "competitive authoritarian regimes" (Levitsky and Way, 2010). A lot of autocracies today have elections and try to imitate democratic institutions, at the same time, the competition in the regimes is very limited. In the regimes a leader is able to exercise the political power and have access to a variety of state resources. The classification does not contain a distinct personalism category that makes it possible to include the observable indicators of personalism and at the same time control for the regime type that to some extent shape power distribution within a regime.

Empirical Analysis

In the research I argue that personalism is intrinsic to all autocracies and even regimes suggesting more institutionalisation may have a relatively powerful leader that has consequences for policy outcomes and economic performance as well. In the work I assume that institutions reflecting the balance of power between ruling elites and the leader serve only as potential boundaries for the leader and as the influecne of institution and the leader in the decision-making process is not known (but I assume that it differs from country to country and within one regime considering different political leaders) there is need to account for personalisation that for some countries may prevail over institutional organisation. It is important to account for different autocratic institutions that influence power organisation and decision-making process. "Autocracies of the World" data set (Magaloni, Chu, and Min, 2013) allows an inclusion of indicators of personalism along with the autocratic regime types, unlike GWF that contains personalism as a distinct category. Another important thing is that it introduces electoral autocracies (or competitive authoritarian regimes) regime type. The regimes represent democratic procedures and institutions (such as party and elections) in the autocratic context. The number of these country-cases representing multiparty autocracy has increased in several years. Firstly, I estimate the model by using within estimator and including the observable indicators of personalism separately with the same set of controls (the results are represented in appendix 1). Estimates of the impact of personalism on economic growth considering only autocratic regimes show the negative effect of power concentration and real purges.

To account for GDP dynamics I estimate the same specifications by using moment-based estimator. Firstly, I estimate each observable indicator of personalism separately. The results show that executive constraints have negative but not significant impact on economic growth. At the same time, the concentration of power measured as a number of years that a unique executive is in power in relation to the duration of the regime, taking into account year that previous executives have been in power, has significant negative impact on economic growth. Leader-elite interactions measured as the ability of the executive to dismiss legislature and ministers is negative but insignificant. At the same time, ability does not mean real actions, however, data about real purges of cabinet and the elite in autocracies are not available. Sudduth (2016) in her work investigates purges of the military elite, she also collects database counting the

cases of real purges for each country. The data are presented only for thirty years period of time (from 1970 to 2003) and not for all countries that decreases the sample size[8][10]. There are only purges of the military but not civilian staff but as they represent real actions of dictators it may be used as a proxy for leader-elite interaction. The estimations where the number of actual purges is included show the significant negative effect on economic growth. As the data contains purges of the military elite the results may be biased due to the fact that the number will be higher in military regimes. To account for the fact I estimate the same model without military regimes, results are the same, real purges of the elite has negative effect on economic growth in autocracies (results are in appendix 3)[9][11].

The model where all observable indicators are included is represented in table 1. Here I include executive constraints, concentration of power, index for leader-elite interactions and an actual number of purges[10][12]. The sign for all the coefficients denoting observable indicators of personalism is negative that is evidence for negative effect of personalism on economic growth. Personalism index denoting the concentration of power and real purges are statistically significant in the model. This means that if dictator stays longer in power he may accumulate more power and remove members of the ruling coalition that may cause potential threat to his survival accounting for the fact that he behaves opportunistically.

To show that personalism even as a distinct regime type affects economy I firstly estimate the model described in the previous section using Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (GWF) typology of political regimes. The estimates for personalism compared to other regimes are still negative meaning the negative effect of personalism on economic growth and become significant and larger in its magnitude (results are in appendix 2). The effect of military regime on economic growth is also negative and significant. The specification where I assume differences between regimes defined as completely personal (high personalism) and those as a mix of personalism and other autocratic types (medium personalism) shows the negative effect of personalism on economic growth as well. The coefficient for higher personalism becomes large and significant, at the same time, medium personalism is negative but insignificant. Likewise, medium level of personalism suggests the existence of some autocratic institutions that may constrain the dictator's power, but still show negative effect on economic performance.

Discussion

The difference between autocratic institutions and their impact on political and economic outcomes have been observed in literature as for different regimes (Persson and Tabellinin, 2006; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2014) as

[8] The variable that use from her dataset is described as "whether there was any purge of a military officer in previous year" (Sudduth, 2016).

[9] As the number of available observations reduces, GMM may be biased because there are more instruments compared to the available observations (overidentification restriction), although FE model shows the same tendency, in the appendix I represent results for the within-based and moment-based estimators.

[10] That also makes the sample smaller, but shows the general tendency of negative impact of higher personalization of power on economic growth.

well as among autocracies (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008). At the same time, leaders play an important role in decision-making especially in autocracies. Theoretical papers point out that personal rule is not conducive to good government because it does not implement general interest policy (in the context ruling coalition) (Besley, Kudamatsu, 2007). Estimating institutions as boundaries is not enough because it is just imprecise limitations on a leader's power and in many cases policy is defined by the leaders' behaviour. Thus, personalism is important but difficult to observe.

Existing papers estimating the effect of different types of autocracies on economic growth rely on assumption that institutions actually constrain dictators in autocracies (Gandhi, 2008). I argue with this position because greater power in hands of the leader despite the existing intuitions gives him an opportunity to implement inefficient policies (Acemoglu, Verdier, & Robinson, 2004; Boix and Svolik, 2013).

Standard regime typologies usually have personalism as a distinct regime type, not accounting for the fact that personalistic tendencies are present in all autocratic regimes to a different degree, it rather accounts for the degree of institutionalization in autocracies. In my work I concentrate on personalism as a trait that is essential to all autocratic regimes, I also account for the fact that it may differ from one leader to another even within one country-regime unit. I also add other observable indicators of personalism. I understand that I estimate only very distinct factors, which are power concertation, executive constraints, and potential ability of a leader to dissolve legislature and ministers. The results support the hypothesis that personalism has negative effect on economic growth.

The results I receive about negative effect of personalism (and in the case observable indicators of personalism) correspond to those of theoretical models (Acemoglu, Verdier, and Robinson, 2004; Boix & Svolik, 2013; Svolik, 2009) and support the idea that if the dictator is too strong institutions cannot bound him and prevent his opportunistic behaviour. As the survival of the dictator in autocracies is associated with the ability of the elite to establish credible threat, it is also associated with conflict of interest. Svolik (2009) writing about established and contested dictatorships notice that power concentration, which develops over time that a leader stays in power, and may lead to opportunistic behaviour of the leader. To account for higher personalism I include in the model not only tenure of the dictator but other indicators that may be accumulated over time, such as the ability to make decisions and shuffle elites. The factors also have negative effect on economic performance that indicates that not only duration of being in power is important but the power itself. Thus, even "stationary bandit" is not a guarantee for economic success because he cannot provide conditions that generate growth (Olson, 1993). Consequently, an accountability problem that in autocracies rather becomes a credible commitment problem cannot be settled if the leader is strong enough to behave opportunistically and not being punished. The long-time horizon does not necessarily stimulate the leader to promote economic growth but may lead to the institutional reshaping without changing the regime type itself.

The work shows only the general tendency that countries where a leader has a lot of power perform worse compared to those where the leader cannot make decisions

on his own without the probability of being removed if the decisions harm public interest. I am not trying to answer the question *why* do dictators behave differently. The different incentives that dictators have may help to explain their behaviour, but still the more power in hands of one man the greater is the probability for the country to be economically unsuccessful. The threat to be dismissed becomes insignificant for the leader, which makes him able to extract rents for his own consumption at the expense of the prosperity for everyone. The heterogeneous economic performance is not only due to the institutional organisation there is also the leader component that contributes to the differences and has to be considered.

References

Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P. and Robinson, J. A. (2014) *Democracy does cause growth*. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w20004.

Acemoglu, D., Verdier, T. and Robinson, J. A. (2004)'Kleptocracy and Divide□and□Rule: A Model of Personal Rule', *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *2*(2–3), pp. 162–192.

Besley, T. J. and Kudamatsu, M. (2007) *Making autocracy work*. Manuscript.

Boix, C. and Svolik, M. W. (2013)'The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships', *The Journal of Politics*, *75*(2), pp. 300–316.

Brownlee, J. (2007) *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge University Press.

Escribà-Folch, A. (2013)'Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004', *Democratization*, *20*(1), pp. 160–185.

Ezrow, N. M. and Frantz, E. (2011) *Dictators and dictatorships: Understanding authoritarian regimes and their leaders*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Gandhi, J. (2003) Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Policies. New York University.

Gandhi, J. (2008)'Dictatorial institutions and their impact on economic growth', *European Journal of Sociology*, *49*(01), pp. 3–30.

Gandhi, J. and Przeworski, Adam (2006)'Cooperation, cooptation and rebellion under dictatorship', *Economics and Politics*, *18*(1), pp. 1–26.

Gandhi, J. and Sumner, J.L. (2014) Measuring Personalism and its Effects in Non-Democracies. Manuscript.

Geddes, B. (1999) Authoritarian breakdown: Empirical test of a game theoretic argument. Paper presented at the *Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta,* Vol. 2, September.

Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E. (2014)'Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set', *Perspectives on Politics*, *12*(02), pp. 313–331.

Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. (2007)'Pathways from authoritarianism', *Journal of democracy*, *18*(1), pp. 143–157.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2002)'The rise of competitive authoritarianism', *Journal of democracy*, *13*(2), pp. 51–65.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2010) *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war*. Cambridge University Press.

Linz, J. J. (2000) *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Magaloni, B. (2008). 'Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule', *Comparative Political Studies*, *41*(4–5), pp. 15–741.

Magaloni, Beatriz, Chu, J. and Min, E. (2013) Autocracies of the World, 1950–2012 (Version 1.0). Dataset, Stanford University.

Meng, A. (2017) Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength. Manuscript.

Olson, M. (1993)'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', *American Political Science Review*, *87*(03), pp. 567–576.

Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G. (2008)'Democratisation and growth', *The Economic Journal*, *118*(532), pp. 1520–1551.

Pepinsky, T. (2014)'The institutional turn in comparative authoritarianism', *British Journal of Political Science*, *44*(3), pp. 631–653.

Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2006) *Democracy and development: The devil in the details*. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w11993.

Sudduth, J. (2016)'Strategic logic of elite purges in dictatorships', *Comparative Political Studies*, pp. 1–39.

Svolik, M. W. (2009)'Power-sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes', *American Journal of Political Science*, *53*(2), pp. 477–494.

Svolik, M. W. (2012) *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press.

Weede, E. (1996)'Political regime type and variation in economic growth rates', *Constitutional Political Economy*, *7*(3), pp. 167–176.

Wilson, M. C. (2014)'A discreet critique of discrete regime type data', *Comparative Political Studies*, *47*(5), pp. 689–714.

Wright, J. (2008)'Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment', *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*(2), pp. 322–343.

Информация об авторе

Mitrokhina Evgeniya Mikhailovna – Research Assistant, Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, National Research University Higher School of Economics. E-mail: emmitrokhina@gmail.com (ORCID: 0000-0001-9327-7612. ResearcherID: C-2911-2018).

Статья принята к печати: 15.10.2018

ОГРАНИЧЕНИЕ ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬНОЙ ВЛАСТИ И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ РОСТ В АВТОКРАТИЯХ

Е. М. Митрохина
Национальный исследовательский университет
«Высшая школа экономики»

Аннотация
Авторитарные режимы различаются степенью ограничения власти лидера: его способностью влиять на процесс принятия решений. Предыдущие исследования не дают четкого ответа на вопрос о том, как сильный лидер влияет на экономику страны. В данной работе я оцениваю влияние персонализации власти лидера на экономические показатели. Хотя в большинстве предыдущих исследований в этой области основное внимание уделяется типологиям режимов, я использую наблюдаемые показатели персонализации власти в 90 автократических странах с 1960 по 2010 г. и оцениваю их влияние на экономические показатели. В качестве наблюдаемых показателей персонализации власти я использую процесс концентрации власти, доступные лидеру полномочия и способность лидера увольнять министров. Результаты свидетельствуют, что страны, где лидеры могут оставаться на посту дольше и способны без ограничений менять кабинет министров, концентрируют больше сил в своих руках, как правило, более оппортунистичны. Результаты предполагают, что сильные лидеры устанавливают такой режим разделения власти, который позволяет им действовать по-своему.

Ключевые слова: ограничение исполнительной власти; персонализация власти; политические режимы.

Table 1. **Effect of Personalism on Economic Growth (moment-based estimator)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Autocracy	-0.003	-0.025	-0.028	-0.005	-0.011	-0.067
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.055)
Executive constraints	0.006					-0.002
	(0.020)					(0.024)
Power concentration 1		-0.037***				
		(0.008)				
Power concentration 2			-0.174***			-0.189***
			(0.046)			(0.047)
Legislature dissolution				-0.002		-0.005
				(0.011)		(0.015)
Ministers dissolution					0.017	0.001
					(0.015)	(0.0221)
Constant	1.225***	1.329***	1.179***	0.937***	0.955***	1.411***
	(0.297)	(0.313)	(0.262)	(0.247)	(0.255)	(0.292)
Observations	4,560	4,707	4,707	4,605	4,605	4,454
Number of countries	129	131	131	130	130	128

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls decades dummies are not represented in the output.
Notes: The table represents estimates for Magaloni et al. (2013) regime type classification considering dichotomous variable (distinction between democracies and autocracies). In column 1–5 there are estimates for each observable indicator of personalism, column 6 represent the specification where all of the indicators are included simultaneously.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Effect of Personalism on (log) GDP per capita (within-based estimator)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Military	-0.056**	-0.049*	-0.054**	-0.096**	-0.096**
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Single-party	-0.039*	-0.033	-0.037	-0.092***	-0.092**
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.040)
Multiparty	-0.061**	-0.052*	-0.058**	-0.109**	-0.110*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.057)
Executive constraints	0.003				0.013
	(0.005)				(0.011)
Personalism index		-0.025**			0.034
		(0.012)			(0.039)
Leader-elite interactions			0.001		
			(0.005)		
Purges of military officers				-0.006	-0.006
				(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	1.796***	1.829***	1.641***	2.846***	3.124***
	(0.564)	(0.567)	(0.547)	(0.823)	(0.889)
Observations	2,364	2,358	2,267	789	788
R-squared	0.962	0.962	0.966	0.928	0.929
Number of countries	90	90	89	51	51

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls and decades dummies are not represented in the output. In all specification I control for country and year fixed effects.
Notes: The table represents estimates for Magaloni et al. (2013) regime type classification considering only autocracies. In column 1–4 there are estimates for each observable indicator of personalism, column 5 represent the specification where all of the indicators are included simultaneously, the fifth specification contains real purges of military elite and does not include his potential ability to dismiss ministers or legislature. For variable Leader-elite interactions I construct an additive index out of two variables: whether a dictator can dismiss legislature and ministers.

Appendix 2. Effect of Personalism on Economic Growth (moment-based estimator)

	(1)	(2)
GWF personalism	-0.071**	
	(0.028)	
Single- party	0.084	
	(0.062)	
Monarchy	0.387**	
	(0.152)	
Military	-0.109**	
	(0.046)	
Medium personalism		-0.046
		(0.067)
High personalism		-0.122***
		(0.032)
Constant	1.669***	1.154***
	(0.454)	(0.319)
Observations	4,173	4,694
Number of countries	120	132

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls and decades dummies are not represented in the output
Notes: The table represents estimates for GWF regime type classification. Column 1 represents estimates for distinction between personalism and hybrid regimes that contain the personalism component. Column 3 represent estimates for GWF regime types classification (hybrids are collapsed according to guidance in the codebook).