Phenomenal character of thinking and the problem of agency of artificial intelligence
Light and shadows of digital reality. The image of the engineer in the 21st century
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2025-3-354-364Keywords:
artificial intelligence’s agency, mind, mental experience, phenomenal character, perceptual qualia, intentionalityAbstract
The paper provides a general overview of current discussions on the phenomenal character of abstract thinking, which throws a fresh light on the problem of agency of artificial intelligence. Narrow and wide interpretations of cognitive experience phenomenal character as presented in contemporary discussions have been analyzed. According to those supporting the strong version of narrow interpretation of the phenomenal nature of cognitive experience, phenomenal properties are only characteristic ofthe sensor-perceptive realm of cognition, while mental experience has purely intentional, but not phenomenal character.The moderate version of narrow interpretation admits that abstract thinking can also have phenomenal character — due to its links with sensual and emotional states. Moderate position of mental experience’s narrow interpretation problematizes the very point of agency of artificial intelligence. Wide interpretation of the phenomenal character of cognition insists that abstract thinking also has phenomenal character: abstract thinking is characterized by «experiencing» a certain cognitive state, «being within» this cognitive state. In the framework of wide interpretation,the intentional character of mental experience seems not be reducible to sensual. The paper analyzes the ontological argument against wide interpretation of phenomenal experience as well as arguments (logical and metaphysical ones) in favor of the possibility of specifically mental phenomenal states. Discussions on cognitive phenomenology throw a fresh light both on the problems of artificial intelligence’s agency and on fundamental problems of epistemology in general. These include the problems of perceptual intentionality and its influence on high-level cognition processes, the qualitative character of mental experience, and the relevance of introspection to abstract thinkingstudies. General conclusion, if abstract thinking has its own phenomenal character, not reducible to phenomenal character of sensual experience, this undermines the foundations of computational cognitive approach and raises research on the problems of artificial intelligence to a higher level.References
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Goldman, A.I. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Vol. 16, iss. 1, pp. 15–28. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00028648
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